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A BIRD IN THE HAND: CALIFORNIA IMPOSES
STRICT LIABILITY ON LANDLORDS IN
BECKER V. IRM CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1730 B.C., Hammurabi, the sixth of eleven kings of the Old Bab-
ylonian (Amorite) Dynasty, promulgated his famous lawcode.1 In this
code the following statute appeared: "If a builder constructed a house
for a seignior, but did not make his work strong, with the result that the
house which he built collapsed and so has caused the death of the owner
of the house, that builder shall be put to death."' Hammurabi's intent is
evident. If a builder defectively produced a dwelling in such a way as to
injure another, after proof of causation, the builder was to suffer punish-
ment in proportion to that injury. The code in essence imposed strict
liability on homebuilders for producing defective dwellings.
Justice Traynor's classical concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.,3 set forth the modem policy justifications for imposing
I. ANCIENT NEAR EAsTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 163-77 (J.
Pritchard ed. 1950).
2. Id. at 176.
3. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). In Escola, the plaintiff, a waitress, was injured
when a bottle containing Coca-Cola exploded in her hand. She brought an action against the
bottling company which had delivered the bottle to her employer, claiming that they were
negligent in selling bottles which, because of excessive gas pressure or because of some defect
in the glass bottle itself, were dangerous and likely to explode. Id. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437-38.
The jury found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed on the ground that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Id. at 457, 150 P.2d at 438. In order for res ipsa loquitur to
apply, two conditions have to be met, namely, that the defendant must have had exclusive
control over the thing causing the injury and that the accident must be of such a nature that it
ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant. Id. at 457-58, 150
P.2d at 438.
The defendants seemed to argue that the first requirement was not met because they had
relinquished control of the bottle some time before the accident occurred. Id. at 458, 150 P.2d
at 438. The court held for the plaintiff stating "[u]pon an examination of the record, the
evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the bottle here involved was
not damaged by an extraneous force after delivery.., by defendant." Id. at 459, 150 P.2d at
439.
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Traynor, agreed with the result of the major-
ity, but not their method, stating:
I concur in the judgment, but I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no
longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the
present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs
an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it
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strict liability. These justifications include deterring the marketing of
products that are a menace to the public.4 Since the Escola decision,
California's doctrine of strict products liability has expanded by leaps
and bounds, covering things Hammurabi could never have anticipated
such as power tools, 5 automobiles, 6 aeronautical maps7 and electricity.8
is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings.
Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor went on to discuss five
related factors which supported his position. Id. at 461-69, 150 P.2d at 440-44 (Traynor, J.,
concurring). For a more detailed discussion of Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola,
see infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
4. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
5. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured while using a power tool. Mr. Greenman had
seen the combination power tool (the "Shopsmith") demonstrated and had studied a brochure
prepared by the manufacturer. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Mr. Green-
man's wife then gave him a Shopsmith for Christmas. Id. The plaintiff was using the Shop-
smith as a lathe to turn a piece of wood which he intended to make into a chalice when the
piece of wood flew from the machine striking the plaintiff on the forehead and inflicting serious
injuries. Id. The plaintiff brought actions against the manufacturer and the retailer based on
negligence and breach of warranty. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99. The
jury found for the retailer and against the manufacturer. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 699. The manufacturer appealed, arguing that the plaintiff did not give it notice of
breach of warranty within a reasonable time and that therefore his cause of action for warranty
was barred by section 1769 of the California Civil Code. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 699. The court held that Civil Code section 1769 did not apply to actions by injured
consumers against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt. Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. More importantly, though, the court held "it was not necessary for
plaintiff to establish an express warranty as defined in section 1732 of the Civil Code." Id. at
62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
California Civil Code section 1732 stated at the time of Greenman:
[A]ny affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce
the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to
be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1732 (West 1962) (repealed 1963, amended and recodified at CAL. COM.
CODE § 2313 (West 1963)). The court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at
62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. For a more detailed analysis of the Greenman
decision, see infra text accompanying notes 69-74.
6. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978). In Daly, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit against General Motors
claiming that the negligent design of defendant's "Opel" model automobile caused the death of
their father in an auto accident. Id. at 730-31, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The
case is more generally known for its holding that comparative fault, under which liability for
damages is assigned in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each of the parties, is
to be applied to actions founded in strict products liability. Id. at 734-43, 575 P.2d at 1167-73,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 385-91.
7. Fluor Corp. v. Jepperson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1985). In Fluor,
the defendant designed, produced, and disseminated aeronautical instrument approach charts
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In each of these instances, courts felt that the policy reasons enumerated
by Justice Traynor in Escola compelled expansion of the doctrine.9
In Hyman v. Gordon,"0 a California appellate court rediscovered
for various airports. Id. at 473, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70. Its approach chart for the Adirondack
Airport failed to indicate Johnson Hill, the highest hill in the landing pattern for that airport.
The pilot of plaintiff's Lockheed Jet relied upon this approach chart. The plane struck the side
of Johnson Hill killing all occupants and destroying the plane. The plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant based on theories of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict products
liability. The plaintiff's strict liability claim was based on the allegation that the instrument
approach chart for Adirondack Airport was defective in design or construction and proxi-
mately caused the loss of plaintiff's plane. Id. The trial court refused to submit the products
liability count to the jury stating that although the court had concluded that the chart was a
product, the principles of strict liability did not apply. Id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The
appellate court held that the trial court's actions were in error, stating:
[w]e... share the belief expressed by the court in Lowrie v. City of Evanston (1977)
50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 8 I1. Dec. 537, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928, "that the policy reasons
underlying the strict products liability concept should be considered in determining
whether something is a product within the meaning of its use ... rather than... to
focus on the dictionary definition of the word."
When so viewed, characterizing respondent's instrument approach charts as
"products" serves " '[Tihe paramount policy to be promoted by the [doctrine],' "i.e.,
"'the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the
spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating them.'"
170 Cal. App. 3d at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
8. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1985).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
10. 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1974). In Hyman, the plaintiff, a minor, was
in his neighbor's garage where he and the neighbor's son were painting model airplanes. After
they had finished, the two boys were looking for solvent to clean their hands. The owner of the
house had been doing some indoor painting and had left paint brushes soaking in a can of
gasoline in the garage. The plaintiff inadvertently kicked over the can of gasoline. The gaso-
line flowed in the direction of a gas water heater four or five feet away. The gasoline ignited
due to the flame at the base of the water heater. The resulting fire caused severe bums to the
plaintiff's left leg from his knee to his ankle. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The plaintiff
asserted a strict liability cause of action against the home builder, alleging that the home was
defectively designed in that the defendant had selected a defective location for the water
heater, i.e., one where fires such as the one which occurred would be more likely to occur. Id.
at 772, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff's strict liability cause of
action. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
The court of appeals reversed the nonsuit against the plaintiff and allowed the plaintiff to
go ahead with his strict liability cause of action, stating:
[I]t seems clear that the [strict liability] doctrine may be applied where, as the proxi-
mate result of a defect in the design of a residential building, and installation of an
article pursuant thereto, injury results to a human being. It is possible that an article
or a machine may function safely in one location in the design but not another. The
gist of plaintiff's allegation in the present case is simply that the Mahan building plan
was defective in causing the water heater to be installed on the floor of the garage.
The evidence showed that the plumbing contractor, Peterson, had installed the
heater on the garage floor of the home with the pilot light and burners elevated four
to six inches above the garage floor. Plaintiff testified that, within seconds after he
had kicked over the can containing the gasoline, the fire exploded in the garage. We
conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to preclude nonsuit as to
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Hammurabi's ancient principle of strict liability for defective dwellings.
In Hyman, a nine year-old boy was severely burned when a water heater,
which was placed in a dangerous location in a neighbor's garage, ignited
a spilled container of gasoline." The court allowed the plaintiff to main-
tain a strict liability cause of action for the defective design of the
house. 12
One of the most recent expansions of the doctrine of strict liability
in California came in the case of Becker v. IRM Corp.I3 In Becker, the
California Supreme Court held that landlords are strictly liable in tort for
latent defects which cause injury to tenants. 4 This Note will discuss the
motives, rationales and necessary implications of this decision in con-
junction with the practical effects likely to ensue from such an expansive
and unfortunate extension of the doctrine of strict liability.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 21, 1978, George Becker, while showering, slipped
and fell against the shower door of his rented apartment.' 5 As a result,
his arm was broken and severely lacerated. 6 The shower door was made
of untempered rather than tempered glass.' 7 According to undisputed
evidence, the risk of serious injury would have been greatly diminished
had the shower door been made of tempered rather than untempered
glass.'8
The thirty-six unit apartment complex in which the accident oc-
the designer. The determination of whether the presence of the water heater in the
garage location constituted a defective design, and the foreseeability of harm result-
ing therefrom, should have been left to the jury.
Id. at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
11. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
12. Id. at 775, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
13. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
14. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
15. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 457, 698 P.2d 116, 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 214
(1985).
16. Id.
17. Id. There are four types of glass commonly available for use in shower doors. The
first is plate or sheet glass. This type of glass is similar to but thicker than the type used in
window panes. When broken, it forms hazardous slivers. A second type of glass is tempered
glass. When broken, it disintegrates into small pieces that normally do not present a serious
laceration hazard. A third type of glass is laminated glass which consists of two pieces of plate
glass bonded together by a tough plastic adhesive. When broken by moderate impact, the glass
clings to the adhesive and does not shatter. A fourth type of glass is wire glass. Wire glass is
similar to laminated glass except that a wire reinforcement rather than a plastic adhesive is
used to prevent shattering. Dickerson, Report on Product Safety: Household Goods, 43 IND.
L.J. 186, 210-14 (1968).
18. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
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curred was built in 1963 and acquired by the IRM Corporation (IRM) in
1974.19 Out of the thirty-six units, thirty-one had untempered glass
shower doors and five had tempered glass shower doors.2 0 The appel-
lant's shower door was installed prior to the date on which IRM ac-
quired the apartment complex."1 Apparently, the shower doors made of
untempered glass were very hard to distinguish from those made of tem-
pered glass in that they both had a frosted glass appearance and no dis-
tinguishing markings except for a very small mark in the corner of each
piece of glass.2"
The plaintiff brought negligence and strict liability actions against
IRM in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County. The trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of IRM. The Court of Appeal re-
versed the lower court's ruling, finding that material issues of fact existed
in both the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims which pre-
cluded summary judgment in favor of IRM.23 The California Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Broussard, affirmed the appellate court's
holding on both the negligence and strict liability causes of action. 4 In a
separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird adopted, in large part,
the opinion of the appellate court.2" Justice Lucas, joined by Justice
Mosk, filed a separate opinion in which he concurred with the majority
as to respondent's negligence cause of action but dissented from the ma-
jority as to respondent's strict liability cause of action. 6 This Note ad-
dresses only those portions of the appellate and supreme court opinions
dealing with respondent's strict liability cause of action.
III. A REvIEw OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
A. Introduction
In examining the holding of the Becker court, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether the majority extended the law of strict liability by charac-
terizing an apartment as a product or whether it extended the law of
premises liability to cover latent defects. This confusion arises from the
fact that the majority relied on two distinct legal concepts for support of
19. Id. at 457-58, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
20. Id. at 458, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
21. Id. at 457-58, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
22. Id. at 458, 698 P.2d at 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
23. Becker v. IRM Corp., 144 Cal. App. 3d 321, 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983), aff'd, 38 Cal.
3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
24. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213.
25. Id. at 469-70, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
26. Id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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its extension of the law of premises liability. While these two concepts,
"liability for injury due to defective conditions" and "uninhabitability,"
have a certain degree of cross over, in an attempt to discern exactly what
the Becker court held, it is important to first outline what the state of the
law was in each of these areas before the decision was rendered.
B. Landlord Liability According to Traditional Property Principles
1. Landlord liability for uninhabitability
The earliest approach to a landlord's duty in this area imposed no
obligation on the landlord, absent an agreement, to present or sustain a
leased dwelling in a habitable condition." The approach became known
as "caveat emptor" or "let the buyer beware."
a. statutory warranties of habitability
More recently, however, the trend has been to impose a greater duty
on the landlord to present and sustain a leased dwelling in habitable con-
dition.28 This trend is reflected in both modern statutes and case law.
The applicable California statute is Civil Code section 1941 which
provides:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of
human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair
all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenant-
able, except [those dilapidations arising from the hirer's want of
27. See, e.g., Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341, 345-46 (1867). In Brewster, an action
was brought on behalf of the estate of the deceased. Id. at 345. The deceased was a tenant in
defendant's house. While the deceased occupied the house, the owners of the adjoining lot
began to excavate that lot. The defendant was given notice of the excavation and warned that
if proper precautions were not taken, the wall of the deceased's home would fall. No precau-
tions were taken by the defendant. One night, the building fell and crushed the deceased. Id.
The court held for the defendant stating, "[t]here was no covenant on the part of the lessors,
the defendants, to uphold or keep the premises in repair, or in a habitable condition. Without
an express covenant to that effect, they were not bound to repair, or to keep the premises in a
habitable condition." Id.
28. The Restatement (Second) of Property provides:
The common law placed the risk on the tenant as to whether the condition of the
leased property made it unsuitable for the use contemplated by the parties. In recent
years, the definite judicial trend has been in the direction of increasing the responsi-
bility of the landlord, in the absence of a valid contrary agreement, to provide the
tenant with property in a condition suitable for the use contemplated by the parties.
This judicial trend has been supported by the statutes that deal with this problem.
This judicial and statutory trend reflects a view that no one should be allowed or
forced to live in unsafe and unhealthy housing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY ch. 5 introductory note (1976).
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ordinary care].2 9
California Civil Code section 1941.1 outlines a series of affirmative
standards which a dwelling must meet in order to be "tenantable," i.e.,
habitable under section 1941.30 Some of those standards include ade-
quate and effective waterproofing and weather protection, plumbing and
gas facilities, hot and cold water supply, sewage system, heating facilities,
electrical lighting and wiring and clean and sanitary buildings, grounds
and appurtenances.31
It is commonly thought that a tenant's sole statutory remedy under
section 1941 is provided for in Civil Code section 1942,32 California's
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1984).
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West 1984). California Civil Code section 1941.1 provides:
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable for purposes of section 1941 if it substan-
tially lacks any of the following affirmative standard characteristics:
(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls,
including unbroken windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing or gas facilities which conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is under the control
of the tenant, capable of producing hot and cold running water, or a system which is
under the control of the landlord, which produces hot and cold running water, fur-
nished to appropriate fixtures, and connected to a sewage disposal system approved
under applicable law.
(d) Heating facilities which conformed with applicable law at the time of instal-
lation, maintained in good working order.
(e) Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment which conformed
with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement of
the lease or rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumu-
lations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin, and all areas under
control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumula-
tions of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin.
(g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish, in
clean condition and good repair at the time of the commencement of the lease or
rental agreement, with the landlord providing appropriate serviceable receptacles
thereafter, and being responsible for the clean condition and good repair of such
receptacles under his control.
(h) Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
31. Id.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1984). California Civil Code section 1942 provides:
(a) If within a reasonable time after written or oral notice to the landlord or his
agent, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 1962, of dilapidations rendering the
premises untenantable which the landlord ought to repair, the landlord neglects to do
so, the tenant may repair the same himself where the cost of such repairs does not
require an expenditure more than one month's rent of the premises and deduct the
expenses of such repairs from the rent when due, or the tenant may vacate the prem-
ises, in which case the tenant shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or
performance of other conditions as of the date of vacating the premises. This remedy
shall not be available to the tenant more than twice in any 12-month period.
(b) For the purposes of this section, if a tenant acts to repair and deduct after
the 30th day following notice, he is presumed to have acted after a reasonable time.
The presumption established by this subdivision is a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of producing evidence and shall not be construed to prevent a tenant from
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"repair and deduct" statute. Section 1942 provides that when a reason-
able time elapses after notice to the landlord a dilapidation rendering the
dwelling untenantable under section 1941.1 is not repaired, the tenant
may repair the dilapidation (providing the repair does not cost more than
one month's rent) and deduct the cost of the repair from the following
month's rent.33 Section 1942 also gives the tenant the option to vacate
the premises, in which case the tenant will be immediately discharged
from the obligation of paying further rent.34 The statute is careful to
leave open the possibility of other remedies provided either by statute or
common law.35
Even though section 1941 includes the phrase "in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary," section 1942.1 provides that "[a]ny agree-
ment by a lessee of a dwelling waiving or modifying his rights under
section 1941 or 1942 shall be void as contrary to public policy .... 36
The sole exception to this broad mandate is that a tenant may agree to
improve, repair, or maintain all or stipulated portions of the dwelling as
part of the consideration for rental.37
Civil Code section 1942.5 protects a tenant from retaliation by the
landlord. That section provides that a landlord may not retaliate against
a tenant for the exercise of the tenant's rights under the preceeding stat-
utes by recovering possession in a proceeding, causing the lessee to quit
involuntarily, increasing the rent or decreasing any services within 180
days after a lessee complains to the landlord or an outside agency, or
after he files documents concerning the tenantability of the dwelling or
after entry of a judgment on that issue.
It is apparent from these provisions that California has sought to
repairing and deducting after a shorter notice if all the circumstances require shorter
notice.
Cd) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy
provided by this chapter, the rental agreement, or other applicable statutory or com-
mon law.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.1 (West 1984). California Civil Code section 1942.1 provides:
Any agreement by a lessee of a dwelling waiving or modifying his rights under sec-
tion 1941 or 1942 shall be void as contrary to public policy with respect to any
condition which renders the premises untenantable, except that the lessor and the
lessee may agree that the lessee shall undertake to improve, repair or maintain all or
stipulated portions of the dwelling as part of the consideration for rental.
37. Id.
BECKER V IRM CORP.
provide an adequate statutory scheme to protect tenants from unscrupu-
lous landlords who neglect their duty to provide habitable dwellings.
b. common law implied warranty of habitability
As previously mentioned, under traditional common law the land-
lord owed no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and
had no obligation to repair subsequent dilapidations.3 8 At the inception
of this common law rule, any structure on the leased premises was likely
to be of the most simple nature, easily inspected by the lessee to deter-
mine if it fit his needs and easily repairable by the typically versatile ten-
ant farmer.39 Additionally, to the traditional agrarian tenant before the
industrial revolution, the land, rather than the structure upon it, was the
most important element in a lease.4 For these reasons, the traditional
common law approach to habitability was well suited for the time period
in which it developed.
Further, the real estate lease emerged from the area of property law,
not contract law. One of the peculiarities of property law is that, because
the law of property predated the development of mutually dependent
covenants in contract law, a lessee's covenant to pay rent was considered
to be independent of any covenants which the landlord may have had
under the agreement. This meant that even if a landlord breached his
covenant to make repairs, this, in and of itself, did not free the tenant
from his duty to pay rent.
In Green v. Superior Court41 the California Supreme Court found
that every lease of a dwelling includes an implied warranty of habitability
which, if breached, can be remedied by the statutory "repair and deduct"
remedy, and by whatever other common law remedy42 is available.4"
The court based its decision on the fact that unlike the traditional agra-
rian lessee of the middle ages, the modem tenant enters a lease not for
the land surrounding the dwelling, but rather for a place to live. Addi-
38. See supra note 27.
39. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-72, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 707-08 (1974).
40. Id. at 628, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
41. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). In Green, a tenant refused
both to pay rent and to vacate the apartment claiming that the existence of some 80 housing
code violations made the premises uninhabitable. Id. at 620-21, 517 P.2d at 1170, ill Cal.
Rptr. at 706. He used a theory of implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an unlawful
detainer action initiated by the landlord. Id. at 620, 517 P.2d 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706. The
Green court allowed the tenant to use a breach of the implied warranty of habitability (if on
remand one was found) as a defense in an action for unlawful detainer. Id.
42. Constructive eviction is an example of a common law remedy.
43. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 631, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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tionally, the court recognized that the modem tenant generally has ac-
quired only a single specified skill by which he makes his living, quite
unlike the "multi-skilled lessee of old" who was able to repair dilapida-
tions to his simple dwelling.' The court also reasoned that modem
dwellings are much more complex than those which existed at the time
the traditional common law rule was formulated. The court reasoned
that this complexity rendered it virtually impossible for a tenant to ade-
quately inspect a dwelling prior to leasing. The court went on to state
that a landlord who has had experience with the building is certainly in a
better position to discover and repair dilapidations in the premises.4"
Further, the court recognized that prior California courts had in-
creasingly recognized the largely contractual nature of contemporary
lease agreements. 46 The court concluded that its holding reflected its be-
lief that the application of contract principles, including the dependency
of covenants, is appropriate when dealing with residential leases of urban
dwelling units.47 With this in mind, the court held that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit the tenant to raise the landlord's breach of an
implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an unlawful detainer
proceeding.
Thus, it seems clear that the statutory and common law schemes in
California at the time the Becker case was decided provided the tenant
various remedies for a contractual breach on the part of the landlord to
uphold his obligations under the lease agreement.
2. Landlord liability for injury due to defective conditions
The traditional common law rule in the area of landlord liability for
injury due to defective conditions was that a landlord was not liable ab-
sent a covenant in the lease, fraud, concealment of the defect or a statu-
tory duty to repair.48 The rule was based on reasoning similar to that
44. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912, 919-20, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721
(1968) (quoting Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal. App. 2d 929, 931-32, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839
(1967)). In Del Pino, the plaintiff rented a dwelling from her landlord which was equipped
with a staircase. However, the handrail on the staircase started halfway down the stairs. On
the day of the accident, the plaintiff was on her way down the stairs to get her cat when the
linoleum on the stairs gave way and she fell down injuring herself. The plaintiff brought an
action against her landlord on the theories of negligence and implied warranty of fitness for a
particular use. Id. at 915, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The trial court nonsuited both of plaintiff's
causes of action. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling reiterating the com-
mon law rule:
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used in the area of habitability49 and on the fact that the landlord lacked
possession and control of the property."
A number of exceptions to the traditional common law rule of ca-
veat emptor developed. These exceptions included liability where the
landlord knew of the defect,51 where a safety law was violated,52 where
[T]here is no liability from the landlord either to a tenant or others for the defective
condition of the demised premises whether existing at the time of the lease or devel-
oping thereafter. This rule applies in California in the absence of: (1) concealment of
a known danger, (2) an express covenant to repair or a promise to repair supported
by consideration, or (3) a statutory duty to repair.
Id. at 919-20, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 721 (citations omitted).
49. See supra note 27.
50. See, e.g., Brennan v. Cockrell Invs., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 799-801, 111 Cal. Rptr.
122, 124-26 (1973). In Brennan, the tenant was injured when a handrail outside the dwelling
he rented from the defendant collapsed, causing him to fall to the ground. Id. at 799, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 124. The court held that lack of possession by the landlord was not a bar to recovery
and that even though a landlord lacked possession at the time of an accident, and thus lacked
control, id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125, this did not compel a judicial amendment to Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1714. Section 1714 states in part:
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management
of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases
is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1984).
51. See, eg., Shotwell v. Bloom, 60 Cal. App. 2d 303, 309-10, 140 P.2d 728, 732 (1943)
(damage to property of employee-invitee of tenant); Stanley v. Lander, 3 Cal. App. 2d 284,
288, 39 P.2d 225, 227 (1934); Hassell v. Denning, 84 Cal. App. 479, 481, 258 P. 426, 428
(1927). Cf. Kearns v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 2d 532, 534, 131 P.2d 36, 37 (1942) (no liability
where defect obvious to ordinary inspection).
52. See, eg., Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 416, 432, 218 P.2d 17, 21, 31
(1950) (landlord held liable when, contrary to city ordinance, exit door opened inward instead
of outward causing injuries in fire); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1961). In McNally, the defendant leased an apartment to the plaintiff which had a garbage
can near the stairway landing. Id. at 874, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62. The wooden railing on the
stairway was defective and the plaintiff fell from the stairs and suffered injuries. Id. at 873, 14
Cal. Rptr. at 261. A city safety ordinance required maintenance of buildings, including egress
facilities, in a safe condition. Id. at 874 n.1, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 262 n.1. The trial judge ruled that
the defendants had no duty to inspect the landing and entered judgment for the defendant. Id.
at 874, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 262. The appellate court reversed, stating:
We have concluded that the crowded conditions of urban living, which probably
inspired the kind of protective ordinance we consider here, render impractical bi-
sected interpretation of the ordinance; it does not establish a duty to the municipality
only but to the tenant as well. If its purpose is to be at all served it must require
inspection of exterior porches and railings by the landlord, who is the most likely
person to be interested in the permanent safety of the property. Similar considera-
tions forbid a two minute mathematical subdivision of areaways in defining common
areas. The landlords' covenant to maintain the premises does not, however, pursuant
to the cases, render them liable for repairs in the absence of notice. We think that
these are the lines of landlord responsibility which the current considerations and
cases draw as to the particular porch and railing here involved.
Id. at 884-85, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69.
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the landlord retained a common area53 or where the lease was for a
semipublic purpose.
54
Thus, with respect to a tenant's possible tort claims against a land-
lord, the state of the law at the time of the Becker decision was that a
tenant could only recover for injuries in the limited circumstances enu-
merated above.
C. Strict Liability
In outlining the modem law of strict liability for personal injury
caused by defective products, two distinct theories require attention.
They are: (1) the theory of strict liability in contract for breach of ex-
press or implied warranty; and (2) the theory of strict liability in tort for
physical harm to persons and tangible things.
1. Strict liability in contract for breach of express
or implied warranty
It is generally thought that the origins of strict liability in warranty
for physical injury lie in the early tort warranty cases dealing with food
and drink.55 These cases, however, like warranty cases in other areas,
were restricted by the requirement of privity of contract between the vic-
tim and the target defendant. In Mazetti v. Armour & Co.56 the require-
53. See, eg., Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 297, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772,
775 (1962) (outside stairs used by tenants to reach various floors and garbage chute; stairs
rotted and unsecured); Hardin v. Elvitsky, 232 Cal. App. 2d 357, 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 748, 753
(1965) (duplex with defective stairs); Sockett v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal. App. 2d 760, 766, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 834 (1960) (apartment with lawn area leading to driveway and street, without
fences or warning signs, and ending abruptly in retaining wall 32-48 inches high).
54. See, e.g., Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 240 P.2d 580, 583 (1952)
(service station); Borroughs v. Ben's Auto Park, 27 Cal. 2d 449, 453, 164 P.2d 897, 899 (1945)
(parking lot); Rau v. Redwood City Woman's Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 549, 245 P.2d 12,
14 (1952) (auditorium for music recital).
55. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 690 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter KEETON].
56. 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). In Mazetti, plaintiffs, owners of a profitable Seattle
restaurant, served a customer a slice of cooked tongue which had at its center "a foul, filthy,
nauseating, and poisonous substance." Id. at 623, 135 P. at 633. Apparently, in the wake of
his nausea, the customer was able to publicly denounce the service to him of the foul and
poisonous food. Id. at 623, 135 P. at 633-34. The restaurant sued claiming loss of reputation
and injury to business. Id. at 623, 135 P. at 634. The defendant demurred to the complaint,
apparently on the grounds that under former law, the manufacturer is not liable to any person
other than the food product's ultimate consumer. The demurrer was sustained by the trial
court. The appellate court reversed stating "[t]his opinion is already too long drawn out ....
Our holding is that, in the absence of an express warranty of quality, a manufacturer of food
products under modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original
packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason of their
use in the legitimate channels of trade." Id. at 630, 135 P. at 636.
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ment of privity was finally discarded in cases dealing with foodstuffs.
Eventually strict liability in warranty expanded beyond food and
drink. The leading case in this expansion was Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,57 a New Jersey decision which relied on food and drink
cases to hold that the manufacturer and retailer of an automobile were
strictly liable under an implied warranty of safety,5 regardless of priv-
ity.5 9 What occurred after Henningsen has been described as "the most
rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts."60 These cases provided courts and
plaintiffs with a whole new theory on which to base recovery for injuries
which might not have been compensated under a negligence theory.
There were severe problems, however, with a theory of recovery
based on warranty. These problems stemmed from the fact that the legal
community identified the term "warranty" with contract law. Contract
law required that in order for a plaintiff to recover under a warranty
theory, he had to rely on the express or implied representations of the
defendant. Often this requirement could not be met.
Additionally, most states had adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) or its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act, to govern the law
of warranty for goods. This presented two major problems in applying a
theory of strict liability for personal injury based on warranty. The first
problem was that the UCC contained a provision requiring the buyer to
give notice within a reasonable time after the breach of warranty oc-
curred.61 This provision acted as a trap door to unwary plaintiffs who
otherwise might have had valid claims. Secondly, the Uniform Sales Act
permitted sellers to insert disclaimers severely limiting or entirely defeat-
ing the warranty.
57. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
58. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. The court stated "[w]e see no rational doctrinal basis for
differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile." Id. at 383,
161 A.2d at 83.
59. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. The court stated "[t]he unwholesome beverage may bring
illness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the driver, occu-
pants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity." Id. at 383,
161 A.2d at 83.
60. KEETON, supra note 55, at 690.
61. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1980). U.C.C. section 2-607(3) states:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2-
312) and the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach he must so notify the seller
within a reasonable time after he receives notice of the litigation or be barred from
any remedy over for liability established by the litigation.
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2. Strict liability in tort for physical harm to persons
and tangible things
Because of these two significant problems in the area of contractual
warranty, in addition to the overall confusion to lawyers and judges
caused by having personal injury cases subjected to the law of contracts,
Justice Traynor wrote his classical concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.6" Justice Traynor seemed to base his concurring opin-
ion on five interrelated factors. First, he felt, "[ilt is to the public interest
to discourage the marketing of products that are a menace to the pub-
lic."'6 3 Second, he felt that the negligence cause of action was not always
adequate to provide a remedy for a party injured by a defective prod-
uct. 4 Third, he felt that the area of liability for products should be
treated no different than that of foodstuffs. He stated:
This court and many others have extended [strict liability] to
consumers of food products, taking the view that the right of a
consumer injured by unwholesome food does not depend "upon
the intricacies of the law of sales." . . . Dangers to life and
health inhere in other consumers' goods that are defective and
there is no reason to differentiate them from the dangers of de-
fective food products.65
Fourth, he reasoned that hand-crafted items had been replaced by mass
produced items, thus altering the once close relationship between the
consumer and the manufacturer whereby the consumer no longer had
the means or skill to inspect the soundness of a product.6 Fifth, as a
result of the altered relationship between the consumer and the manufac-
turer, "[the consumer's] erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady
efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and mar-
keting devices such as a trade-marks [sic]. . . . Consumers no longer
approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying on the repu-
tation of the manufacturer or the trademark."67 For these reasons, Jus-
tice Traynor concluded in Escola that "[t]he retailer, even though not
equipped to test a product, is under an absolute liability to his customer,
for the implied warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable
quality include a warranty of safety of the product."68
62. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). For a discussion of Escola, see supra note 3.
63. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 465, 150 P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Traynor, 3., concurring).
68. Id. at 464, 150 P.2d at 441-42 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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Some nineteen years after Justice Traynor wrote his concurrence in
Escola, he wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc.,6 9 the case which made strict liability for products the law in
California. In Greenman, the notice requirement of the Uniform Sales
Act70 once again came into controversy.7" Justice Traynor, again out-
raged at seeing a plaintiff's case bogged down by the "intricacies of the
law of contracts," declared that
to impose strict liability on the manufacturer under the circum-
stances of this case, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to es-
tablish an express warranty as defined in section 1732 of the
Civil Code. A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being.
72
He further stated that "[w]e need not recanvass the reasons for imposing
strict liability on the manufacturer. They have been fully articulated."
73
Thus, Justice Traynor made strict liability for products the rule in Cali-
fornia, stating that the "costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts [should be] borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to pro-
tect themselves."'74
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT IN BECKER V. IRM CORP.
A. The Majority Opinion
In Becker v. IRM Corp.,75 the court began its analysis with a discus-
sion of the history of strict liability. While the court acknowledged Es-
cola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.76 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.77 as the cases most applicable to a discussion of the modern policy
considerations behind strict liability, it recognized that earlier cases im-
posing liability on product manufacturers and retailers relied on the the-
69. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For a discussion of Greenman,
see supra note 5.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1769 (repealed 1963).
71. 59 Cal. 2d at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
72. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (citing his own concurring opinion in
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)) (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
75. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
76. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). For a discussion of Escola, see supra note 3.
77. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For a discussion of Greenman,
see supra note 5.
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ory of express or implied warranties running from the manufacturer to
the plaintiff."' The majority then recognized that Escola and Greenman
sought to remove cases dealing with product safety from the realm of the
"intricacies of the law of sales."
79
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Becker court reasoned that
the paramount policy reason behind the imposition of strict liability, ex-
pounded by Justice Traynor in Escola and in Greenman, was also present
in cases of landlord liability. The court stated that "Greenman ... noted
that the purpose of strict liability in tort is 'to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.' ",
The court next seemed to suggest that the law of strict liability has
not been restricted to manufacturers of fungible products. Rather, the
concept had been extended to parties traditionally accessible only under
the auspices of property law: lessors of personal property,"' builders who
impliedly represent the quality of their product 2 and manufacturers of
78. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 458-59, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
81. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). In
Price, the plaintiff, an airplane mechanic, sustained injuries when a ladder he was climbing
split into segments. Id. at 248-49, 466 P.2d at 723-24, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80. The ladder was
attached to a truck leased from Shell by plaintiff's employer. Id. The plaintiff brought causes
of action against the defendant based on negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. Id.
at 249, 466 P.2d at 24, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180. The jury awarded the plaintiff $41,000. Shell
contended the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury on the issue of strict liability.
Id. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
[W]e are of the opinion that the doctrine of strict liability in tort should be made
applicable to bailors and lessors of personal property in the same manner as we have
held it applicable to sellers of such property. Mindful of the purpose of such doctrine
as explicated by us in Greenman and Vandermark and most recently in Elmore we
can find no significant difference between a manufacturer or retailer who places an
article on the market by means of a sale and a bailor or lessor who accomplishes the
same result by means of a lease.
Id. at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
82. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969),
In Kriegler, the defendant built a home and installed at the time of construction a radiant
heating system. Id. at 225-26, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 751. A radiant heating system is one in which
pipe is laid in the center of the cement foundation of the house. The pipe is then heated by
some substance passing through. This process results in the heating of the home. Id. The
defendant used steel tubing in the construction of the heating system because copper was
scarce as a result of the Korean War. Id. at 225, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The steel pipe eventu-
ally corroded, causing the heating system to leak and become ineffective. Id. at 226, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 751. Eichler appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 225, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 75 1. The appellate court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff stating, "[w]e think,
in terms of today's society, there are not meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass pro-
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residential lots.83
The court stated that developments in the area of landlord-tenant
liability have led courts to imply a warranty of habitability for rented
dwellings. 84 The court quoted the Restatement (Second) of Property,
which provides that "[i]n recent years, the definite trend has been in the
direction of increasing the responsibility of the landlord, in the absence of
a valid contrary agreement, to provide the tenant with property in a con-
dition suitable for the use contemplated by the parties.""5 This trend, it
was argued, was followed in Green v. Superior Court,86 where the court
implied a warranty of habitability. The Green court referred to a lease
for a certain period of time as a "product," recognizing that the average
prospective lessee is not qualified or allowed to inspect the product thor-
oughly.8 7 Further, the Green court stated that the primary responsibility
for keeping the leased premises in a habitable condition should fall on the
landlord.88
The Becker majority further based its opinion on past California
Supreme Court decisions holding that a landlord who offers an apart-
ment for rent makes an implied representation that the apartment offered
is safe and fit for use as a dwelling. 9 Justice Broussard reasoned that a
tenant purchasing housing for only a limited period of time is generally
duction and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the
pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same." Id. at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
83. See Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). In
Avner, the defendant was the owner and developer of lots in the Santa Monica Mountains near
Los Angeles, California. Id. at 608, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The defendant prepared the lot for
the construction of a home. Id. The plaintiff's predecessor in interest purchased the lot and
built a house upon it. Id. Due to inadequate draining and improper compaction of fill on the
lot, the slope of the lot failed on several occasions causing the plaintiff damages. Id. at 609, 77
Cal. Rptr. at 635. The trial court dismissed the suit and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate
court reversed stating:
We are unable to distinguish the obligation of a builder to a purchaser for a defective
radiant heating system installed in a cement floor slab [see Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969), discussed supra note
82] from the obligation of a manufacturer of a lot to a purchaser for defective subsur-
face conditions resulting from improper filling and grading that cause instability. In
view of the recent action of the Supreme Court in denying a hearing in Kriegler, we
conclude that the manufacturer of a lot may be held strictly liable in tort for damages
suffered by the owner as a proximate result of any defects in the manufacturing
process.
Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
84. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 462, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY ch. 5 introductory note (1976).
86. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). For a discussion of Green,
see supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
87. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
88. Id. at 623-28, 517 P.2d at 1172-75, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708-11.
89. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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in no position to inspect for defects in light of the relative complexity of
- the modem apartment building/unit.9" Further, even if the tenant could
adequately inspect the apartment for such defects, he is generally in no
position to bear the pecuniary obligation of permanent repairs on an
apartment in which he has no equitable interest.91
Conversely, the majority reasoned, the landlord is in a better posi-
tion to bear the costs of injury because (1) he may adjust the price he
originally pays for a rental building based on the quality of the building,
the cost of protecting the tenants, the cost of repairs and replacement of
defects and insurance, (2) the landlord may increase the rent charged for
a rental unit, and (3) the landlord will often be able to seek equitable
indemnity for losses or be able to indemnify himself through strict liabil-
ity insurance.92 Here, the court stressed that it is fundamentally prefera-
ble for the landlord to bear the cost of injuries " 'rather than the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.' ,,93
Additionally, Justice Broussard reasoned that a line of California
cases had already extended the doctrine of strict liability to the landlord-
tenant relationship. Traditionally, the court stated, a landlord was not
liable for injuries suffered by tenants resulting from defects in the leased
premises unless there was a covenant in the lease, or the tenant could
prove fraud or concealment.94 Prior to Greenman, California afforded
the tenant/victim a remedy only through the doctrines of express95 and
implied warranty.96 However, subsequent to Greenman, two important
appellate court decisions applied the doctrine of strict liability to land-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
93. Id. at 467, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)).
94. See Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1968). For a
discussion of Del Pino, see supra note 48.
95. See Shattuck v. Saint Francis Hotel & Apartments, 7 Cal. 2d 358, 60 P.2d 855 (1936).
In Shattuck, the door to which a folding bed was affixed fell and injured the plaintiff. Id. at
359-60, 60 P.2d at 856. The landlord had assured the plaintiff that the construction of the bed
was safe. Id. The court held that a lessee could recover for breach of an express warranty of
fitness. Id. at 360-61, 60 P.2d at 856.
96. See Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931). In Fisher, the plaintiff
sustained injuries from a bed which was included in a room he leased from the defendant. The
door to which the bed was attached fell off over the top of the bed and caused injury to the
plaintiff. Id. at 249, 2 P.2d at 519. The court held that "[iln the renting of a furnished apart-
ment there is an implied warranty that the furniture is fit for use or occupation. The defend-
ants had a superior knowledge of the operation of the door and bed." Id. at 250-51, 2 P.2d at
520.
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lords for injuries to tenants.97
The first of those appellate court decisions was Fakhoury v.
Magner.98 In Fakhoury, a tenant was injured when a couch which had
been selected by the landlord and included with a furnished apartment
collapsed. 99 The court, relying on cases holding a lessor of personal
property strictly liable in tort,'" held that the landlord was strictly liable
in tort for the leasing of defective furniture."0 The Fakhoury court took
special pains to emphasize that its holding did not grant to the plaintiff a
strict liability cause of action for defective premises, but limited the cause
of action to strict liability for the supply of defective furniture. 02
In the second important appellate court decision, Golden v. Con-
way,' 0 3 a tenant suffered property loss in a fire caused by a defectively
manufactured or installed wall heater."° The Golden court declined to
follow the distinction made in Fakhoury between defective fixtures and
defective furniture, holding that a landlord engaged in the business of
leasing property' 015 is strictly liable in tort when he equips the premises
with an appliance 0 6 which proves to have defects which cause injury to
97. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972), and Golden v.
Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
98. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
99. Id. at 61, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
100. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). For a
discussion of Price, see supra note 81; see also McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274
Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969). In McClaftin, the plaintiff brought a wrongful
death suit against the defendant who had rented a step ladder to the decedent. While using the
ladder to drill holes in the ceiling, the ladder cracked, throwing the decedent to the floor and
causing him to sustain head injuries from which he died two days later. Id. at 449, 79 Cal.
Rptr. at 338. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on strict liability. The appellate court
reversed stating "[iln sum, the rationale of Greenman and Vandermark applies as logically
and desirably to a lessor of chattels as to the manufacturers or retailers thereof." Id. at 452, 79
Cal. Rptr. at 340.
101. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
102. Id. See also infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
103. 55 Cal. App. 3d. 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
104. Id. at 951, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
105. See infra text accompanying note 204 for an analysis of what "engaged in the busi-
ness" of leasing property might mean.
106. The court makes no attempt to define what is meant by "appliance." Further, no other
courts have sought to define the term. Webster's defines an appliance as "a household or office
utensil, apparatus, instrument, or machine that utilizes a power supply, esp. electric current (as
a vacuum cleaner, a refrigerator, a toaster, an air conditioner)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 104-05 (14th ed.
1968). While the court is most cryptic in its use of the word appliance, it is probable that they
sought to include something more than what Webster's suggests-a couch such as the one in
Fakhoury was obviously meant to fall within the confines of the term-and something less than
those things the term "fixture" would describe. See infra note 158 for the definition of
"fixture."
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the tenant. 10 7 Unfortunately, the Becker opinion did nothing more than
mention these cases, their holdings and policy. The majority was silent
as to how these cases might prove useful in analyzing the facts before the
court.
Justice Broussard concluded that the rationale of the foregoing cases
required the court to conclude that "a landlord engaged in the business
of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a
latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the
premises were let to the tenant."'
10 8
B. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
1. Chief Justice Bird's concurrence
In Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion, she stated that "Justice
Newsom wrote a fine opinion in the Court of Appeal with which I agree.
It is adopted herewith as my own."109 Thus, her concurring opinion
merely restated the opinion of the appellate court.
The concurring opinion, discussing the plaintiff's strict liability
cause of action, stated that California courts have "freely applied strict
liability in tort law link by link in the marketing chain" 1' 10 to all those
who are "an 'integral part of the overall producing and marketing enter-
prise.' "' The opinion further stated that prior cases have included
landlords within the scope of the strict liability doctrine."
2
The opinion then went on to discuss Fakhoury and Golden in light
of this "marketing enterprise" idea by emphasizing that the defective
items in those cases were supplied by the landlord. The concurring opin-
ion stated that "[h]ere, respondent is in the business of leasing apart-
ments, including appliances and fixtures, and is therefore an integral part
of the marketing enterprise by which the shower door in question
reached the user public."' ' The opinion, after quoting at length from
Green, stated:
The landlord is a vital link in the commercial chain, and di-
rectly profits from the consumer's use of products provided as
107. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 961-62, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78. See also infra notes 160-65 and
accompanying text.
108. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
109. Id. at 470, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
110. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 475, 698 P.2d at 130, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
111. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
112. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
113. Id. at 476, 698 P.2d at 228, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
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part of the rental unit. We think it a reasonable rule that a
landlord should be treated as a "retailer" of rental housing,
subject to liability for defects in the premises rented." 4
Thus, the concurring opinion seemed to suggest that IRM was liable to
Mr. Becker because, as the supplier of the entire apartment, it acted as a
vital link in the marketing chain which ultimately brought the plaintiff
into contact with the defective shower door.
The opinion went on to enumerate the policy considerations which
weighed in favor of the imposition of strict liability. Specifically, these
considerations included the protection of otherwise defenseless victims,
the placing of the economic burden of injury upon those most culpable
and those most able to bear it, the fact that a landlord may be able to
spread the cost of injury through insurance and, finally, the fact that the
landlord has control of the rental premises from which the possibility of
harm from defective appliances can be eliminated."1 5 The concurring
opinion seemed to suggest that the defective shower door in the plain-
tiff's apartment was a design defect rather than a manufacturing defect
and ended its analysis by restating the Barker v. Lull 116 test for whether
a product is defective in design:
First, a product may be found defective in design if the
plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product
may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his
114. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
115. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
116. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). In Barker, the defendant
manufactured a "high lift loader" designed to lift massive loads so that they can be kept level
while the vehicle itself rests on sloped terrain. There was evidence that the regular operator of
the high lift loader did not show up on the day of the accident because he knew that the loader
was not designed to make the lifts scheduled for that day. Instead, the plaintiff, who was
relatively inexperienced, was assigned the task. During the lifting of lumber on particularly
difficult terrain, the plaintiff felt the high lift ladder begin to vibrate. Some of his co-workers
shouted to the plaintiff to jump from the loader because it was beginning to tip. The plaintiff
did so, but while scrambling away, he was struck and injured by lumber falling from the
vehicle. Id. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. The plaintiff brought a cause of
action based in strict liability against the defendant. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 445-46, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 227-28. The case is famous for its discussion of what is meant by the term "defect."
The trial court instructed the jury that strict liability for a defect in design was based on a
finding that the product was "unreasonably dangerous for its intended use." Id. at 417, 573
P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228. The California Supreme Court held that to give this in-
struction to the jury was error. Id. The court then stated a new test for finding design defects.
See infra text accompanying note 117.
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injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the rele-
vant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged de-
sign outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
17
Finally, Chief Justice Bird stated that the design of a product must
take into consideration a certain degree of foreseeable misuse.,' She
thereby inferred that the apartment which incorporated into its design
this particular shower door was indeed defective under Barker v. Lull in
that it failed to perform safely in a situation which would seem
foreseeable.
2. Justice Lucas' concurrence and dissent
Justice Lucas concurred with that portion of the majority's opinion
which dealt with the plaintiff's negligence cause of action, but dissented
with the majority as to the plaintiff's strict liability cause of action. 19
Justice Lucas argued that the majority made an "unprecedented leap"' 20
from previous formulations of landlord liability and imposed "'an unu-
sual and unjust burden on property owners .... [T]he landlord [will] be
faced with liability for every injury claim resulting from any untoward
condition in every cranny of the building, whether it is reasonably fore-
seeable or not.' "121
Justice Lucas discussed Escola and Greenman, pointing out that at
117. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d 445-46, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
118. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
119. Id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
120. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Dwyer v. Skyline
Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd
obiter dictum, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973)). In Dwyer, the defendant was the landlord of
the apartment in which plaintiff had been a tenant for 15 years. Id. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
The plaintiff, while in the bathtub, sought to add hot water. As she turned on the hot water
faucet, the entire fixture came out of the tile, as a result, scalding water gushed out and burned
the plaintiff on various parts of her body. Id. The trial judge found for the plaintiff on the
ground that a landlord is strictly liable because of a contractual responsibility flowing from a
continuing implied convenant of habitability. Id. The Superior Court of New Jersey held that
even though the warranty of habitibility imposed a duty on the landlord, the nexus between
duty and liability was proof of negligence. Id. at 52, 301 A.2d at 465. The court held that an
extension of strict liability to cover landlords was unwarranted, stating:
[t]he underlying reasons for the enforcement of strict liability against the manufac-
turer, seller or lessor of products or the mass builder-vendor of homes do not apply
to the ordinary landlord of a multiple family dwelling.
Such a landlord is not engaged in mass production whereby he places his pro-
duct-the apartment-in a stream of commerce exposing it to a large number of
consumers. He has not created the product with a defect which is preventable by
greater care at the time of manufacture or assembly. He does not have the expertise
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the time those decisions were rendered, strict liability applied only to the
party who actually made the product. Subsequently, strict liability was
extended to retailers in the case Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.122 The
rationale in support of the extension, Justice Lucas pointed out, was that
liability under such circumstances would work no injustice to the defend-
ants because they could "'adjust the costs of such protection between
them in the course of their continuing business relationship.' "123 Justice
Lucas impliedly suggested that the requirement of a "continuing business
relationship" with its accompanying policy considerations also played a
to know and correct the condition, so as to be saddled with responsibility for a defect
regardless of negligence.
An apartment involves several rooms with many facilities constructed by many
artisans with differing types of expertise, and subject to constant use and deteriora-
tion from many causes. It is a commodity wholly unlike a product which is expected
to leave the manufacturer's hands in a safe condition with an implied representation
upon which the consumer justifiably relies.
The tenant may expect that at the time of the letting there are no hidden danger-
ous defects known to the landlord and of which the tenant has not been warned. But
he does not expect that all will be perfect in his apartment for all the years of his
occupancy with the result that his landlord will be strictly liable for all consequences
of any deficiency regardless of fault. He expects only that in the event anything goes
wrong with the accommodations or the equipment therein, the landlord will repair it
when he knows or should know of its existence; and that if injury results liability will
attach.
To apply the broad brush of strict liability to the landlord-tenant relationship in
a dwelling house would impose an unusual and unjust burden on property owners. It
would mean that the landlord would be faced with liability for every injury claim
resulting from any untoward condition in every cranny of the building, whether it is
reasonably foreseeable or not. How can a property owner in any practical sense
prevent a latent defect or repair it when he has no way of detecting it? And if he
cannot prevent the defect or the occurrence, why should he be liable? ...
... Neither justice no [sic] reason dictate the advisability of a change in land-
lord-tenant law which would permit recovery for personal injuries without proof of
deviation from the standard of reasonable care.
Id. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at 467.
122. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). In Vandermark, the defend-
ant, a Ford dealer, sold an automobile to the plaintiff who was seriously injured when the
steering failed causing the plaintiff's car to swerve into a pole. Id. at 259, 391 P.2d at 169-70,
37 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98. The court held that a retailer could be held strictly liable in tort for
injuries caused by a defective product, stating:
[R]etailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the
public. They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing expertise
that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products .... Strict
liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the
injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the
costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business rela-
tionship. Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the business of distributing goods to
the public, [the defendant] is strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by
defects in cars sold by it.
Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
123. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 480, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262,
391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900).
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significant role in the extension of strict liability in Price v. Shell Oil
Co.124 to cover lessors and bailors of personal property.'
2
Justice Lucas stated that the requirement of a "continuing business
relationship" was given no meaningful consideration by the majority.'
26
He pointed out that in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,127 a case relied
upon by the majority, the court's holding that strict liability extended to
mass producers and sellers of homes rested on the identification of Eich-
ler as a "manufacturer"' 128 of homes. Justice Lucas doubted the applica-
bility of strict liability where, as here, the defendant was a purchaser of
property that had already been "manufactured." In illuminating this
distinction, Justice Lucas pointed out the distinction between "a party
actually selecting, installing, constructing and buying the defective prod-
uct and a party who plays no such role and therefore has no connection
with anyone up the ladder of distribution." 129 He further noted that this
distinction was fundamentally adhered to by the court of appeal in both
the Fakhoury and Golden cases cited by the majority. Justice Lucas sug-
gested that the cases dealing with the sale of used machinery offer an
excellent example of courts' unwillingness to extend strict liability absent
a " 'continuing business relationship with the manufacturer in the course
of which he can adjust the cost of protection from strict liability.' "Y130
Justice Lucas stated that the majority opinion placed too much em-
phasis on the "risk spreading" function of strict liability and too little
emphasis on "other crucial and long-recognized justifications for [the]
imposition of strict liability,"' 3 1 such as using strict liability as an incen-
tive for a manufacturer to improve product safety and as a way to rem-
edy a plaintiff who was misled by a false representation. Justice Lucas
stated that these rationales mitigate against application of the doctrine in
the leasing of property in that: (1) a landlord who purchases a leasable
dwelling from another is unable, through subsequent dealings with the
124. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). See supra note 81.
125. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 480, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). For a discussion of Kriegler, see supra
note 82.
128. Kriegler, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
129. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 481, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Tauber-Arons Auctioneers v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 279,
283, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (1980)).
131. Id. at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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manufacturer, to improve product safety in the future; and (2) contrary
to the majority's implication, even though a landlord may impliedly rep-
resent to a tenant that the premises are habitable, he does not represent
that he has expertise concerning every item forming the apartment or
that every item in the premises is in perfect condition.
13 2
The majority pointed out that landlords who buy used leasable
dwellings are essential to the rental business, that they have more than a
random or accidental role in the marketing enterprise and, therefore, that
landlords are in the stream of commerce and subject to strict liability.' 33
The dissent asserted that one major difficulty with the majority's ap-
proach is that it focuses on the wrong "stream of commerce." 134 The
majority focused on the fact that landlords play an essential role in rent-
ing dwellings. Justice Lucas asserted, however, that attention should in-
stead be focused on the stream of commerce through which defective
products reach the market and that landlords who buy used buildings are
likely to have no direct or continuing relationships with the manufactur-
ers and marketers of the particular defective products found on the
premises. 135 Justice Lucas stated that "[ilt is illogical to conclude that
[IRM] became part of the overall marketing scheme for the shower doors
merely by purchasing property in which they had long since been
installed."'
1 6
Justice Lucas also questioned the majority's contention that a con-
tinuing business relationship is never essential to the imposition of strict
liability.' 37 Justice Lucas suggested that only where the manufacturer is
unavailable may it be appropriate to go outside the marketing chain in
order to compensate the plaintiff.13  However, the majority stated in its
recitation of facts that the plaintiff had previously settled its case against
the builder and a door assembler and installer for a minimum of
$150,000 and had actions pending against defendants other than the
landlord.139 Thus, it would not have been necessary in this case to go
132. Id. at 482-83, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
134. Id. at 483, 698 P.2d at 136, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
135. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 484, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 484, 698 P.2d at 136-37, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34 (Lucas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
138. Id. at 484, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
139. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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outside the marketing chain to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.
Finally, Justice Lucas noted that "[n]o matter how carefully [land-
lords] inspect, and no matter how impossible to discern the defect, [land-
lords] are now the last outpost of liability for countless unrelated
products in which they have no particular expertise."' 140 In a footnote,
the dissent quoted a New Mexico case which stated that "[a] major con-
sideration in holding lessors of commercial products strictly liable was
that such lessors possessed expert knowledge of the characteristics of the
equipment or machines they leased." 141 That case refused to extend
strict liability to a motel operator, holding that a person who makes a
one-time purchase of furnishings and fixtures about which he has no par-
ticular expertise could not be realistically compared with a commercial
lessor of personal property. 42 Justice Lucas suggested that the same ra-
tionale applied to landlords who purchase used buildings and who may
now, under the majority's holding, be "strictly liable for defects of which
he or she has no knowledge or reason to know and which appear in any
part of the property no matter how esoteric the understanding necessary
to comprehend the working of that part."'1
43
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Premises as Product
The first of the many important issues which must be discussed is
the Becker majority's characterization of an apartment, as a whole, as the
product to which strict liability applies. In its discussion, the majority
seemed to suggest that there are really two different theories on which to
base its conclusion that an apartment is a product.
1. Green's interchanging use of the terms "apartment" and "product"
The first theory equating an apartment with a product is based on
140. Id. at 485, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
141. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Livingston v. Begay,
98 N.M. 712, 716, 652 P.2d 734, 738-39 (1982)). In Livingston, the plaintiff brought an action
as a representative of a motel guest who was asphyxiated overnight when gas escaped from a
gas space heater in his motel room. 98 N.M. at 714, 652 P.2d at 736. The court held that a
motel operator is not strictly liable for defects in the fixtures and furnishings of the rooms he
lets out to the public. Id. at 717, 652 P.2d at 739.
142. Livingston, 98 N.M. at 716-17, 652 P.2d at 739.
143. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 483-84, 698 P.2d at 136, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (Lucas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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certain language interchanged by the court in Green v. Superior Court.144
However, before embarking upon this discussion, it is important to iso-
late precisely what part Green plays in the discussion of a tenant's recov-
ery for personal injury on a theory of strict liability.
On their face, Green's facts are fundamentally distinguishable from
those in Becker. In Green, the tenant refused both to pay rent and to
vacate the apartment because of the existence of some eighty housing
code violations which he claimed made the premises uninhabitable. The
tenant used a theory of implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an
unlawful detainer action initiated by the landlord, a contractual defense
based on the theory of independent covenants. 145 Conversely, Becker
was an action instituted by the tenant against the landlord for personal
injuries based on the theories of negligence and strict liability in tort. No
housing code violations were alleged. These factual distinctions in Green
and the resulting legal theories relied upon for analysis should point to
the conclusion that Green will prove to be of limited applicability in a
suit by a tenant for personal injury based on a theory of strict liability.
The primary factual similarity between Becker and Green is that, in
both cases, the California Supreme Court sought to extend the rights of
tenants. In accomplishing this goal, both cases relied on a common set of
policy considerations. Stated simply, those considerations were that
modem city dwellers are ill equipped to repair or inspect modem apart-
ments and that there exists a severe shortage of low-cost housing, leaving
tenants with little bargaining power. Green analogized to the dramatic
changes in the law of commercial transactions, where modem decisions
have recognized that the consumer in an industrial society should be en-
titled to rely on the skill of a supplier or the assurances of a retailer.146
It is at this point that the language of Green bears relevance to the
first theory equating an apartment with a product. The Green court
stated:
In most significant respects, the modem urban tenant is in
the same position as any other normal consumer of goods.
Through a residential lease, a tenant seeks to purchase "hous-
ing" from his landlord for a specified period of time. The land-
lord "sells" housing, enjoying a much greater opportunity,
incentive and capacity than a tenant to inspect and maintain
the condition of his apartment building. A tenant may reason-
144. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). For a discussion of Green,
see supra note 41.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
146. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1174-75, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
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ably expect that the product he is purchasing is fit for the pur-
pose for which it is obtained, that is, a living unit. 147
The Becker court used this language equating an apartment with a
"product" as a stepping stone to its conclusion. The majority stated that
the Green court "[p]oint[ed] out that the modem urban tenant is in the
same position as any normal consumer of goods," concluding that "a
tenant may reasonably expect that theproduct purchased is fit as a living
unit. .... ,141 This reference to Green's interchangeable use of the terms
"apartment" and "product" seems to have been a primary basis for the
Becker court's conclusion that an apartment is, in and of itself, a product.
However, the Becker majority's reliance upon the Green language is
problematic. The interchanging of the words "product" and "apart-
ment" in Green was used to help the reader visualize a new and difficult
concept. The product to which the Green court referred seems to be the
"package of goods and services"' 149 performed by the landlord, such as
the supplying of adequate heat, light, and ventilation, serviceable plumb-
ing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper
maintenance.' 50 In Green, the "product"-this package of goods and
services-was found to be "defective" only after the landlord had been
given notice of and an opportunity to correct the conditions rendering
the dwelling uninhabitable.' 5' Thus, the Green court interchanged the
words "apartment" and "product" to illustrate the concept that the
147. Id. at 626-27, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (emphasis added).
148. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 462, 698 P.2d 116, 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 218
(1985) (emphasis added).
149. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The facts
of Javins are similar to those in Green. A coalition of three tenants refused to pay rent. When
their landlord sought an unlawful detainer against the tenants, they raised housing code viola-
tions by the landlord as a defense to nonpayment. Id. at 1073. The court stated that:
[T]he assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a
lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable
in a rural, agrarian society; it may continue to be reasonable in some leases involving
farming or commercial land. In these cases, the value of the lease to the tenant is the
land itself. But in the case of the modem apartment dweller, the value of the lease is
that it gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on
the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below, or even
in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his apartment. When Ameri-
can city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known
package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and ceil-
ings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
Id. at 1074 (footnote omitted).
The court went on to hold that a warranty of habitability, measured by the standard set
out in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law in
all leases. Id. at 1081.
150. Id. at 1074.
151. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 620-21, 517 P.2d at 1170-71, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
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package of goods and services for which the tenant contracted, if found
lacking after proper notice, could supply a tenant with a "defense against
nonpayment"; in other words, a "contractual" '152 warranty.
It is obvious from the facts of Green and its procedural posture that
it was not attempting to add apartments to the list of "products" covered
by the doctrine of strict liability or to affect the law of strict liability in
any way. Green merely analogized to an area where the law seemed to be
providing more protection to the consumer. For this reason the Becker
court seems to have placed too much weight on Green's interchanging of
terms. Becker's reliance upon Green's characterization of an apartment
as a product is, it appears, ill-founded.
2. The contributions of Fakhoury and Golden
a. the characterization of an apartment as a product-a second theory
The second theory supporting Becker's characterization of an apart-
ment as a product comes from the court's analysis of two California ap-
pellate court decisions which applied strict liability in a landlord-tenant
relationship, Fakhoury v. Magner15
3 and Golden v. Conway.1 54
In Fakhoury, the plaintiff tenant was injured when a defective
couch, which was purchased by the defendant landlord and included
with plaintiff's furnished apartment, collapsed. 55 The plaintiff sat on
the couch and, due to the looseness of the wires supporting the cushion,
fell through and injured her back. 56 The appellate court held that
"under the circumstances of this case, the doctrine of strict liability does
apply to the landlord, not as lessor of real property, but as lessor of the
furniture."'' 5 7 In this way the Fakhoury court acknowledged the differ-
ence between holding the landlord strictly liable for defective fixtures1
5 1
on the premises, an issue which should be decided on the basis of strict
premises liability, and holding the landlord strictly liable as a lessor of
152. The distinction between strict contractual warranties and common law tort warranties
is important here. In Green, the court recognized that the common law rule regarding leases-
that they were independent covenants, see supra text accompanying notes 46-47-was being
supplanted by the contractual rule that covenants are dependent upon each other. Thus, in
formulating its holding, the Green court recognized the contractual nature of the issue before
it.
153. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
154. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
155. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
156. Id. at 61, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
157. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
158. Fixtures have been described as "[e]hattels placed on or affixed to land or structures
attached to land by the landowner for the purpose of 'improving' the land...." R. CUNNING-
HAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 13 (1984).
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defective chattels. 15 9
In Golden, the landlord hired an independent contractor to install a
wall heater 60 in what was arguably a residential leased premises. 161 It
was argued that the wall heater, because of either defective manufacture
or installation, caused a fire in which the tenant suffered a loss of prop-
erty.162 The court of appeal noted the distinction made in Fakhoury be-
tween defective fixtures and defective furniture'63 but saw "no reason to
distinguish between appliances which are attached to the realty, and ap-
pliances or furniture which are not,"'"concluding:
[When] a lessor of real property who . . . is engaged in the
business of leasing apartments and appurtenant commercial
premises, equips the premises with an appliance without know-
ing whether or not it is defective because of the manner in
which it was manufactured or installed, and it proves to have
defects which cause injury to persons or property when used in
a normal manner, [he] is strictly liable in tort.
165
The Becker majority seemed to suggest that Golden erased the dis-
tinction raised in Fakhoury between liability for the leasing of defective
chattels and strict liability based on leasing an apartment with defective
fixtures (i.e., defective premises). This apparently provided the Becker
majority with the missing link in the chain between strict liability for
leased chattels and strict liability for leased premises.
There are inherent problems with a theory of liability based on this
reasoning. In Golden, the court of appeal was struggling with what it
perceived to be an artificial distinction: those who were injured by rented
property which was not attached to their rented premises were allowed
recovery while those injured by rented property which was attached to
the rented premises were not allowed recovery. The court, therefore,
fashioned a rule which broke down this artificial distinction. That rule,
distilled to its essence, is that if an owner of a leased premises installs an
159. The court cited Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970) for support of the proposition that strict liability in tort is applicable, "under certain
circumstances, to lessors who have placed articles on the market knowing that they are to be
used without inspection for defects." Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
160. Golden, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 952, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
161. The premises in Golden was a store which was rented by the tenant in which he al-
lowed an employee to live. The store was admittedly designed for the occupation of human
beings in that it was equipped with a kitchen, bath and an extra room. Id. at 962, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 78.
162. Id. at 953, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
163. Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
164. Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
165. Id. at 961-62, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
January 1987] BECKER V IRM CORP.
appliance166 which turns out to be defective, the plaintiff may recover,
whether or not that appliance was attached to the leased premises. The
court of appeal could have just as easily held that premises containing a
fixture with a dangerous propensity are defective. It did not do so. In-
stead, it focused its holding upon the defective nature of the appliance.
In Becker, the majority did not conclude that the appliance itself (the
shower door) was defective, 16 7 but that the premises were defective. That
is, the apartment itself was defectively designed or manufactured because
it was designed and manufactured with a dangerous shower door.
168
The import of this distinction becomes obvious when one considers
an example where, in the absence of any sort of defective fixture or appli-
166. The court in Golden left this term undefined. See supra note 106.
167. The court could have ruled that the shower door was defective under the first prong of
the test given to us in Barker v. Lull, i.e., it did not meet ordinary consumer expectations. For
a discussion of Barker, see supra text accompanying note 116. The plaintiff may also have had
a claim based on the doctrine of foreseeable misuse/crashworthiness. See Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Co., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin, the plaintiff,
the driver of a bread delivery truck, was injured when his truck collided with another vehicle
and a metal hasp (a hasp is a hinged fastening device which consists of a fiat metal piece with a
hole which fits over a metal "staple" through which a lock or pin is inserted) behind the
driver's seat failed. The loaded racks of the bread truck flew forward striking the plaintiff in
the back and forcing him through the windshield. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 155, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 435. The case is famous for disapproving the requirement that a product be "unreasonably
dangerous" before an action can be brought in strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1972) (amended 1973 to delete "unreasonably dangerous" requirement).
The court additionally refuted the defendant's argument that plaintiff's use of the delivery van
was unforeseeable. The court stated:
[The defendant's] argument that the van was built only for "normal" driving is un-
availing. We agree that strict liability should not be imposed upon a manufacturer
when injury results from a use of its product that is not reasonably foreseeable.
Although a collision may not be the "normal" or intended use of a motor vehicle,
vehicle manufacturers must take accidents into consideration as reasonably foresee-
able occurrences involving their products .... The design and manufacture of prod-
ucts should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but with recognition of the
realities of their everyday use.
Id. at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
Given the facts in Becker, a court could have found that the realities of a shower door's
everyday use (i.e., used in the immediate proximity of wet and slippery surfaces, generally no
other means of support were a consumer to slip, the prominence of shower doors designed to
lessen the severity of such accidents), were such that an accident involving a shower door was
reasonably foreseeable.
168. For the purposes of this Note, it might be clearer to use the terms used by the court in
this difficult and elusive area. When the court says an apartment is manufactured, they seem
to be referring to its construction. When they allude to its design, they are speaking of how it
was drawn out in blueprints or engineered. A similar situation was presented in Avner v.
Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969), where the court held the
defendant strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a defectively
"manufactured" residential lot. The "manuacturing" process in that case evidently consisted
of moving in fill dirt and grading in preparation for the construction of the house. Id. at 615,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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ance, premises may be considered defective. 169 For example, setting
rooms at different floor levels was a popular architectural style at one
time. When entering a different room, one is necessarily forced to either
step up or step down. If a tenant were at some point to do neither and
injure himself, what appliance is to be blamed for the injury?170 The
defect, if one were indeed found, would not lie in any particular appli-
ance, but in the defective design of the apartment itself. Under Becker,
the tenant, if he could prove causation, would be allowed to assert a strict
liability cause of action. Under Golden, which requires the presence of a
defective appliance, he would not be allowed to assert a strict liability
cause of action. 171 Further, the Golden court leaves the term "appli-
ance" undefined. Is a shower door an appliance under Golden? Is a
doorknob, paint or wooden framing? A defect in any of these might sub-
ject a landlord to liability under Becker but, arguably, not under Golden.
In conclusion, Becker's characterization of an apartment as a prod-
uct is clearly too broad, if that characterization is to be based on Golden
and Fakhoury. Fakhoury plainly attempted to limit strict liability to fur-
niture only, while Golden intended to broaden that liability but only to
the extent of using the broader word "appliances." Moreover, the char-
acterization of an apartment as a product may lead to results unforeseen
by the Becker court. Plaintiffs with otherwise meritless cases would be
allowed to recover under Becker's overbroad formulation of the duty
owed by landlords.
169. The full implications of the Becker opinion are not apparent from the facts of the case
because the defect in the apartment stemmed from a defect in a shower door, arguably a
"fixture."
170. Louisiana, a state which by statute imposes strict liability for latent defects upon the
landlord, has ruled on a case with closely related facts. In Morgan v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981), the decedent, a woman in her 80's, was walking down a
church corridor on her way to the bathroom when she tripped and fell on an eight inch step
between the corridor and the church's gown room. Id. at 641. The decedent suffered a frac-
tured hip and died four days later as a result of complications from surgery. Id. The court
held that the eight inch drop between the rooms constituted a defect in that it was "difficult if
not impossible for the approaching [person] to discern the difference in levels of the floor." Id.
at 642.
Another example would be where a landlord leases a room to a tenant which is equipped
with a glass wall such that a person who thought that there was no glass walked through it.
There are endless other examples, such as a floor which is unduly slippery, a counter level
which is not dangerous to adults but dangerous to children, an auto garage which is designed
defectively, etc.
171. Of course, under Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), principles of comparative negligence would be applicable to products
liability actions and might limit the plaintiff to only partial recovery. See supra note 6. The
set-off would be measured by the extent to which the tenant's own negligence is found to have
contributed to his tripping.
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b. expertise as a rationale for applying strict liability
Apart from the above-mentioned reasons for disfavoring extension
of the term "product" to include an apartment as a whole, there lies
another reason which deals with the underlying rationale for the applica-
tion of strict liability.
In Becker, Justice Lucas suggested in his dissent that one of the
traditional rationales for applying strict liability to products is that man-
ufacturers, unlike consumers, through their experience in manufacturing
a product develop an expertise in that area.172 This rationale most likely
does not apply to extend the concept of strict liability to a landlord and
his "product," the leased premises.
It has been held that, while this rationale applies to lessors of per-
sonal property, it does not apply to motel operators who lease rooms.
Justice Lucas, in his dissenting opinion in Becker, quoted the New Mex-
ico case of Livingston v. Begay,17 3 where it was stated that
[a] major consideration in holding lessors of commercial prod-
ucts strictly liable was that such lessors possessed expert knowl-
edge of the characteristics of the equipment or machines they
leased .... These considerations do not apply when a motel
operator makes a one-time purchase of furnishings and fixtures
about which he has no special expertise. Therefore, we hold
that a motel operator is not strictly liable for defects in the fix-
tures and furnishings of the rooms he held out to the public. 74
The Livingston court suggested that a motel operator should not be
held strictly liable for defects in "fixtures" and "furnishings" because he
cannot be held to the same level of expert knowledge as a product manu-
facturer or lessor of non-realty. Because a motel operator cannot be ex-
pected to possess expertise in all the areas covered in a modern motel, the
court concluded that a very important public policy behind imposing
172. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 485 n.4, 698 P.2d at 137 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.4 (Lucas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This rationale was also suggested by Justice Tray-
nor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). Justice Traynor sought to explain why strict liability in tort should apply to
manufacturers as well as retailers. In doing so, he stated "[c]ertainly there is greater reason to
impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product that
he is not himself able to test." Id. at 468, 150 P.2d at 443-44. Justice6 Traynor thereby sug-
gested that one of the reasons strict liability should be imposed on manufacturers is related to
their ability to differentiate between a good and a bad product, in other words, their
"expertise."
173. 98 N.M. 712, 652 P.2d 734 (1982).
174. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 485 n.4, 698 P.2d at 137 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.4 (Lucas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Livingston v. Begay, 98 N.M. 712, 716-17,
652 P.2d 734, 738-39 (1982)).
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strict liability was absent. The motel operator cannot realistically be ex-
pected to spot defects in furnishings or fixtures with one hundred percent
accuracy. For example, a motel operator is less likely than the manufac-
turer of a gas heater to know the difference between a defective gas heater
and a nondefective gas heater. However, the Becker court would hold
landlords of leased dwellings to an expert's standard. The Livingston
court felt that such a rule would be absurd and held instead that the
motel operator's lack of expertise should weigh in favor of non-imposi-
tion of strict liability.
Further, even if the Livingston court had adopted strict liability for
motel operators, distinctions between motel operators and apartment
owners readily come to mind. For example, motel operators have more
control over rooms because they have daily access to them. Motel rooms
also require continual maintenance and upkeep for the next guest. An
apartment owner has neither the same amount of control nor the duty to
clean and inspect a room every day. Thus, the arguments against hold-
ing a motel operator strictly liable seem to apply with even more force to
apartment owners.
In Becker, the court's characterization of the entire rented premises
as the product allowed it to gloss over this point. Although the majority
did not expressly refer to the foregoing policy consideration, in charac-
terizing the entire premises of the leased dwelling unit as a singular pro-
duct it implied that, much like the producer of a product made up of
components, the landlord should have expert knowledge in every aspect
of the rental of that apartment. However, it is one thing to say that a
landlord is an expert at leasing rental dwellings. It is quite another to say
that a landlord possesses expert knowledge of the myriad of components
which comprise the leased dwelling. Because of the practical impossibil-
ity of obtaining expert knowledge of all the components of an apartment,
landlords must rely on others for their safe manufacture, installation and
repair. In this respect, landlords are in no better position to know of
defects than are tenants, yet they are held to the ultimate standard."'5
175. It may be argued that landlords are in a better position to inspect than a tenant in that
they have the benefit of ownership for an extended period of time. This argument is suspect
for two reasons. First, it ignores the possibility that a tenant who has lived in his apartment
for 15 years may sue a person who has owned the apartment building for 15 days. Second, it
ignores the fact that the amount of time an apartment is actually open to landlord inspection
may be limited to the time between successive tenants. The aggregate of this time over several
years may not amount to the time of tenancy of a single occupant.
BECKER V IRM CORP.
c. deciding the case under Fakhoury or Golden
As stated above, Fakhoury stood for the proposition that a landlord
may be subject to strict liability if he leases a tenant furniture which
proves to be defective and which injures a tenant. Golden stood for the
proposition that a landlord may be subject to strict liability if he leases a
tenant a dwelling he has equipped with fixtures or appliances which
prove to be defective and injure the tenant. Thus, it seems that at the
time that Becker was decided, the law was that the landlord was always
subject to strict liability for leased furnishings, but he was only subject to
strict liability for fixtures in his leased dwelling if he actually installed the
defective fixture.
IRM claimed that Fakhoury was not applicable because the injury
in that case resulted from defective furniture, while Mr. Becker was in-
jured by a defective fixture. IRM additionally claimed that Golden was
inapplicable because there the landlord installed the heater, while in the
present case the shower door was apparently installed by the builder.
As a result, in order to grant Mr. Becker a strict liability cause of
action, the court was compelled to extend the law in some way. There
were several ways in which the court could have done so.
One option the court had was to hold a landlord strictly liable for
defective furniture or fixtures. This would have been a variation of the
Fakhoury holding. This option would focus the analysis on the issue of
whether the shower door was a defective fixture. It would have required
a slight extension of the law, but the inherent problems of characterizing
a leased premises as a whole as the defective product would have been
avoided. However, the problem with this option is that Fakhoury's facts
are distinguishable from Becker's as the landlord in Fakhoury directly
supplied the defective couch. The Becker court could have avoided this
problem by reasoning that a landlord, in supplying premises, likewise
supplies those component parts installed by the builder or previous own-
ers. 176 Thus, even though IRM did not install the defective shower door,
the court could have found that they did indeed supply the shower door.
A second option the court had was to hold a landlord strictly liable
for defective fixtures regardless of who installed them. This would have
allowed the court to accomplish its goal of spreading risk of injury
176. This option would only apply to installations by the builder or previous owners. It
would not apply to installations carried out by former tenants or their agents. Thus, for exam-
ple, if a landlord did not know that a former tenant repainted several rooms in an apartment
with lead paint and the landlord painted over that paint with a safe paint before a new tenant
leased the apartment, the landlord would not be liable for injuries resulting from the lead
paint.
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throughout the marketplace while again avoiding the characterization of
the leased dwelling as a whole as the defective product. This option is
slightly different from the one above in that it would include installations
by former tenants.
A third option was to do exactly what the Becker court did, which
was, specifically, to ignore the difference between fixtures and furnish-
ings-thereby placing the focus on the leased dwelling as a whole-and
to extend strict liability to apply to landlords who did not install the
defective component. In choosing this option, the court managed to ex-
tinguish the Fakhoury distinction between leased personalty and leased
premises and to blur the distinction made in Golden between landlords
who install the fixtures and those who do not. By adopting this third
option, the Becker majority extended not one, but two separate doctrines.
An extension of this magnitude was not required to provide Mr. Becker
with a strict liability cause of action.
B. The Effectiveness of Prevention or Detection Through Imposing
Strict Liability
The majority stated, as support for holding landlords strictly liable
for latent defects, that "[t]he tenant purchasing housing for a limited pe-
riod is in no position to inspect for latent defects in the increasingly com-
plex modern apartment buildings.., whereas the landlord is in a much
better position to inspect for and repair latent defects." '
This argument may be founded on either or both of the following
assumptions. The first assumption is that a landlord is more capable than
a tenant to inspect apartments. However, this argument was addressed
earlier in this Note, where it was pointed out that landlords are not capa-
ble of providing an inspection so thorough that all defects would be elim-
inated.178 Knowledge of an apartment's structure and components is not
a prerequisite to ownership. It would be unrealistic to expect any person
to be an expert in every aspect of an apartment. Thus, the court's reli-
ance on this assumption to support their holding seems ill-founded.
The second assumption is that a landlord has a greater opportunity
to inspect than does a tenant. However, this assumption is also question-
able. Is it true that a landlord has a greater opportunity to inspect an
apartment for latent defects than does a prospective tenant?'79 How is
177. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464, 698 P.2d 116, 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219
(1985).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
179. The definition of "latent" is "[h]idden; concealed; dormant." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 794 (5th ed. 1979). It may be argued that the defect in the premises in Becker, the shower
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"adequate opportunity" to be defined? Even if IRM had completed "ad-
equate inspection" of the premises, there inevitably would have been
some defects in the apartment which would have defied discovery. It
appears that the Becker court expected IRM to have not only determined
the breakage propensities of the shower door but to also have inspected
the condition of electrical conduits running behind walls, the hidden
plumbing, the insulation and the foundation of the building. If the ex-
pectations of the Becker court are taken at face value, a landlord might
very well feel compelled to come to the apartment at the time of the
inspection not with a magnifying glass but with a demolition crew.
C. Strict Liability as an Effective Deterrent
In his classical concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,18°
Justice Traynor stated: "Even if there is no negligence,.., public policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively re-
duce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market . . . ,"'' and later, "[i]t is to the public interest to
discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to
the public." '182 Justice Traynor made it clear that one of the primary
policy reasons for imposing strict liability on product manufacturers is
that by imposing such liability, manufacturers will be encouraged to pro-
duce safer products. 83
Is this policy consideration served by imposing strict liability upon
landlords for latent defects in the premises? This question must be an-
swered in the context of two distinct factual settings. The first is where
door, was not a latent defect, but a patent one. The court, in its statement of undisputed facts,
indicated that the shower door had a marking which somehow revealed that the glass was
untempered rather than tempered. See supra note 22. It is not clear from the statement of
facts whether this mark was obscure enough to render the untempered nature of the glass
hidden or concealed. On the other hand, even if the marking could be clearly read, there is
some question as to whether the "reasonable tenant" would find the description "tempered" or
"untempered" meaningful.
180. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
181. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 436 (Traynor, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
183. Further support for this policy consideration is supplied by cases from other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,
537 P.2d 682 (children injured when they consumed part of hog feed grain treated with seed
disinfectant), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (defective sanding machine). Some commentators have
argued, however, that strict liability is not generally an effective deterrent to production of
defective products. See Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an
Old "Defense," 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 249 (1977); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for
Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957).
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the landlord has himself installed the defective component or has had a
building built which has defects apart from any components. In that
case, the landlord would be in a position of control over the building
which will be leased. If he knows that he will bear the burden of com-
pensating a tenant who is injured as a result of a defect in materials or
workmanship, the landlord may indeed take greater precautions. For
example, he is likely to pay more for a more experienced contractor or
generally keep tighter control over the installation or construction.
184
The second circumstance is the situation where, as in Becker, the
landlord purchases a building from another and leases units in the build-
ing. Here, the result is different. In that case, the imposition of strict
liability can have no deterring effect because the landlord took no part in
producing the leased dwelling or installing the defective component.
Quite the contrary, the landlord who is forced to rely on the expertise of
those who built the leased dwelling and installed its components is now
going to be held strictly liable for actions on their part even though he
has absolutely no opportunity to change the method of operation.
D. The Propriety of Holding a Second Buyer Strictly Liable
In Becker, IRM argued that a landlord who purchases existing used
housing should not be held strictly liable.185 It based this argument on
language found in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,'86 which stated that
"[s]trict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum
protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defend-
ants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the
course of their continuing business relationship."'87 IRM claimed that it
had never been in a business relationship with the builder and that pur-
chasers of used housing normally do not retain continuous business rela-
tionships with builders which would allow them to adjust costs.188 IRM
sought to illustrate an analogous trend in the practice of selling used ma-
chinery.1 89 The cases in this area hold that a seller of used machinery,
who sells that machinery "as is" and who does not rebuild or rehabilitate
it, is not strictly liable in tort.19 Some of these decisions seem to suggest
184. It may also be argued, however, that a landlord will be less likely to make needed
improvements if by doing so he would subject himself to further liability.
185. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 465, 698 P.2d 116, 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 220
(1985).
186. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
187. Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (emphasis added).
188. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
189. Id.
190. Wilkinson v. Hicks, 126 Cal. App. 3d 515, 179 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1981) (strict liability cause
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that a used machinery dealer is not part of the manufacturing and mar-
keting enterprise. 91
The court brushed over IRM's argument by holding that a continu-
ing business relationship is not essential to the imposition of strict liabil-
ity.192 It first reasserted its view that the paramount policy in imposing
strict liability
remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of com-
pensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing de-
fects .... Just as the unavailability of the manufacturer does
not militate against liability, the absence of a continuing busi-
ness relationship between builder and landlord is not a factor
warranting denial of strict liability of the landlord.193
The court further contended that "[i]f anything, the unavailability of the
manufacturer is a factor militating in favor of liability of persons engaged
in the enterprise who can spread the cost of compensation." '94 Appar-
ently, this statement is based on the court's feeling that the primary pol-
icy consideration behind extending strict liability is the compensation of
defenseless victims.
The court distinguished landlords who purchase existing rental
units from sellers of used machinery by first asserting that, unlike the
sellers of used machinery, a landlord plays an essential (i.e., not "ran-
dom" or "accidental") role in the rental business. Second, landlords are
unlike the sellers of used machinery because they retain a continuing re-
lationship to the leased dwelling. Third, the landlord differs from the
seller of used machinery in that he makes representations, implied or
express, of habitability and safety.
Are all of the court's distinctions viable? First, consider the court's
statement that "a continuing relationship is not essential to imposition of
strict liability" because the paramount policy for applying strict liability
is to spread throughout society the cost of compensating "defenseless"
of action rejected against seller of 50-year-old punch press); LaRosa v. Superior Court, 122
Cal. App. 3d 741, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1981) (strict liability cause of action rejected against
seller of used punch press); Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.
3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980) (strict liability cause of action rejected against seller of used
planer).
191. See supra note 186.
192. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. It is important to
note, however, that here the court overstates IRM's argument. IRM did not assert that it was
essential to the imposition of strict liability that there be a continuous business relationship,
merely that it would be unfair to the landlord to do so in the absence of a continuous business
relationship.
193. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
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victims. However, how much cost spreading actually occurs? The court
stated in a footnote that the plaintiff had already settled with the builder,
door assembler and installer for "$150,000 plus $50,000 in the event
plaintiff is unsuccessful against the remaining defendants."195 In light of
the fact that the plaintiff had already made a good faith settlement with
the builder, assembler and installer, the defendant landlord is precluded
from seeking equitable indemnification from them. 196 Additionally, since
there is no continuing relationship between the builder and the landlord
who buys a used building, the cost of protection cannot be considered in
further dealings. In the words of Justice Lucas, "[u]nlike retailers, les-
sors, bailors, wholesalers or others in the original chain of distribution of
the product, the landlord owning used property cannot adjust the costs
of protection up the chain. He may only do it, at best, down the chain of
'distribution,' namely by charging more to his tenants."' 97 In light of the
current shortage of low cost housing in most areas, one must wonder
whether passing added costs on to tenants, perhaps driving decent hous-
ing out of the reach of some, serves public policy.
The court's distinction between landlords who purchase used build-
ings and sellers of used machinery must also be scrutinized. The court
sought to distinguish landlords who purchase old buildings and sellers of
used machinery on the grounds that landlords have an essential role in
the rental business. That is to say, without landlords, buildings could not
be let. However, if it were not for used machinery salesmen, could used
195. Id. at 457 n.1, 698 P.2d at 117 n.1, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214 n.l. Indeed, one is forced to
wonder whether a plaintiff who can negotiate a settlement for $200,000 for injuries sustained
when he slipped in the shower can in all propriety be characterized as "defenseless."
196. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 877, 877.6 (West 1984). Section 877 provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or
more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort-
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1984).
Section 877.6 provides:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged
tortfeasors ....
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indem-
nity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West 1986).
197. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 485, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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machinery be sold? The court skirted this issue by suggesting that sellers
of used machinery are not essential to the sale of "machinery" implying
all machinery. All machinery, however, is not of importance. For the
purposes of the court's example, only defective used machinery should be
considered. But for used machinery salesmen, defective used machinery
would not reenter the market. Thus, used machinery salesmen are just as
essential to defective used machinery sales as landlords who lease second-
hand buildings are essential to defective rental dwellings.
The court further attempted to distinguish used machinery salesmen
from landlords who purchase and lease old buildings by stating that
landlords have a continuing relationship to the leased property. How-
ever, the meaning of this distinction is unclear. If the court is suggesting
that it is proper to impose strict liability because of the landlord's ability
to inspect and repair, the fact is that the landlord has little ability to
inspect an unwilling tenant's apartment once the tenant has assumed res-
idence.1 98 Conversely, if the court was suggesting that privity exists be-
tween the landlords and tenants, but not between used machinery
salesmen and their customers, the answer is that: (1) this is not true and;
(2) it has been clear for some time in California that privity is not re-
quired to assert a tort cause of action.1 99
The court then distinguished sellers of used machinery and land-
198. In California, the applicable statute is CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954 (West 1985). Section
1954 provides, in relevant part:
A landlord may enter the dwelling unit only in the following cases:
(a) In case of emergency.
(b) To make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations or improve-
ments, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective
or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen or contractors.
(c) When the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.
(d) Pursuant to court order.
Id.
Even though subsection (b) impliedly allows entry for necessary "services," inspection of
an uncooperative tenant's apartment is not clearly sanctioned. Given the fact that the possible
consequences of entry against a tenant's will include both civil and criminal liability, it would
be an optimistic attorney, indeed, who would advise his client to enter the apartment and
inspect against the tenant's wishes. Id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1159 (West 1985);
Winchester v. Becker, 4 Cal. App. 382, 88 P. 296 (1906) (landord found guilty of forceable
entry into tenant's dwelling).
199. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). In Biakanja, the plaintiff's
brother died testate leaving all his property to the plaintiff. 49 Cal. 2d at 648, 320 P.2d at 17.
Because defendant did not see to it that the will was properly attested, the plaintiff received
only one eighth of the decedent's estate. Id. She brought a negligence action against the de-
fendant. The court stated that the issue in the case was "whether defendant was under a duty
to exercise due care to protect plaintiff from injury and was liable for damage caused plaintiff
by his negligence even though they were not in privity of contract." Id. at 648, 320 P.2d at 18.
The court concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover despite the absence of
privity. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
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lords who buy used buildings by stating that landlords, unlike sellers of
used machines, make representations of habitability and safety. The
court suggested that when the landlord rents an apartment, he "guaran-
tees" that it will be habitable and safe. The court cited no authority for
this statement, but it is likely that it was derived from language in Green
v. Superior Court.2 00 A careful reading of Green, however, requires a
different interpretation.
In Green, the tenant refused to pay rent because of the existence of
over eighty housing code violations in his apartment. These included:
"(1) the collapse and nonrepair of the bathroom ceiling; (2) the contin-
ued presence of rats, mice, and cockroaches on the premises; (3) the lack
of any heat in four of the apartment's rooms; (4) plumbing blockages;
(5) exposed and faulty wiring; and (6) an illegally installed and danger-
ous stove. ' '20 ' Green held that substantial compliance to the housing
code would in most cases suffice to meet the landlord's obligation to pro-
vide habitable living quarters.20 2 In Becker, the plaintiff did not contend
that the shower door in question violated the housing code. Addition-
ally, the defect was latent. In other words, from all appearances, IRM
was justified in representing2 3 that Mr. Becker's apartment was habita-
ble and safe because there was virtually no way of telling otherwise.
IRM was not required by the Green decision to guarantee that no tenant
would ever be injured in its apartment. Green, in attempting to battle the
mounting problem of "slum lords," required at least substantial compli-
ance with the housing code from those who let apartments. The Green
court imposed an implied guarantee from landlords that leased dwellings
would meet the minimum standards required by the housing code. Mr.
Becker did not argue that his apartment did not meet this standard.
Thus, IRM did not breach its duty to provide a habitable dwelling as that
term is defined in Green. Holding that Green imposes an implied guaran-
tee of absolute safety misinterprets the law and imposes an impossible
duty on landlords.
E. Who is Strictly Liable Under Becker?
In view of Becker's extensions in the law of landlord-tenant liability,
it must be determined who exactly is liable under the court's holding.
How many apartments must a landlord own before he is "engaged in the
200. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
201. Id. at 620-21, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
202. Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
203. There is nothing in the factual statement of the case to suggest that any representations
were made to Mr. Becker, other than those implied in law by cases such as Green.
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business of leasing dwellings?"'2"4 Does the Becker rule apply to both
residential and commercial landlords?
The Becker court, in the rule it fashioned, held that a landlord "en-
gaged in the business of leasing dwellings" is strictly liable in tort for
injuries resulting from latent defects. This language suggests that only
those landlords for whom leasing dwellings is an actual business will fall
within the rule. The same language, however, may also be read to sug-
gest that any person who rents a dwelling to another is engaged in the
business of leasing.
Turning to the Becker decision for clues, the court stated earlier in
its opinion that California follows a "stream of commerce" approach to
strict liability in tort, which extends liability to "all those who are part of
the 'overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost
of injuries from defective products.' "205 In its discussion of California's
stream of commerce approach, the court cited Price v. Shell Oil Co.206
which defined what is meant by "commerce." The Becker majority
stated that in Price, where the court held that strict liability was applica-
ble to lessors and bailors, "it was pointed out that strict liability does not
apply to isolated transactions such as the sale of a single lot."20 7
There is no other mention in the majority's opinion as to what con-
stitutes a landlord "in the business of leasing dwellings" and therefore
becomes subject to the Becker rule. It is unlikely that the court intended
that persons are only subject to the rule of this case if they lease dwellings
as their sole occupation. It is also likely that, by citing Price, the major-
ity intended that only a landlord who offers more than one dwelling for
rent will fall under its rule. Given the paramount policy consideration of
the Becker court, that the loss from injury should fall not upon the victim
but upon the party more able to bear the burden, it is at least arguable
that whenever a landlord is making money on a rental, even if it is from
renting a single room of a house, he will be held strictly liable as the
party most able to bear the economic burden. However, this should not
be the result because a landlord who rents a single room of his house has
no way to pass on the cost of liability. Thus, if this reading were given to
the Becker opinion, the cost of injury would be arbitrarily shifted from
one party to the other. In conclusion, although the court's intent is not
204. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464, 698 P.2d 116,122, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219
(1985).
205. Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
206. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
207. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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clear, it appears that the lessor of a single dwelling would escape strict
liability.
The second question is whether the court's rule applies only to resi-
dential rentals or whether it also extends to units rented for commercial
purposes. The court's holding stated that a landlord is strictly liable in
tort if he is engaged in the business of leasing "dwellings. ' 20 8 The term
"dwellings" has been defined as "[t]he house or other structure in which
a person or persons live; a residence. '20 9 Therefore, the holding on its
face seems to apply only to landlords who lease units for housing
purposes.
Although the facts of this case concern a residential rental unit, and
a vast majority of the cases cited by the majority in support of its propo-
sition concern housing units, it can be argued that the policy considera-
tions considered by the Becker court are equally applicable to lessors of
commercial units. The policy consideration of spreading the cost of com-
pensating a victim applies with equal validity to the lessee of a store who
is injured on a defectively designed loading dock. Thus, while this actual
issue was not addressed by the Becker court, it is likely that other courts
may interpret the rule as applying to lessors of commercial units. Argua-
bly, however, a distinction exists between a residential tenant and a com-
mercial tenant. A commercial tenant is not the "innocent victim" that
the Becker court seemed to be concerned with. A commercial tenant is
more likely to be aware of its exact needs when searching for a building
and more aware of the characteristics and problems with a particular
building once it is leased. It can be argued that a commercial tenant
needs less protection. Thus, in light of the policy considerations es-
poused in Becker, and in light of the increased sophistication of most
commercial tenants, the inclusion of the commercial building within its
rule does not seem likely.210
208. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
209. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 454 (5th ed. 1979).
210. Large commercial investors, however, do not seem so convinced. At a recent Coldwell
Banker Symposium, a memo was circulated dealing with the presence of asbestos in leased
commercial buildings. The memo stated:
One thing came out loud and clear at the Coldwell Banker Symposium; the
asbestos problem is enormous in terms of potential impact and currently no one
knows how to solve the problem. Insurance companies are, or soon will be, exclud-
ing this item from liability coverages. The word is that the EPA soon will be requir-
ing disclosure to tenants. Major sophisticated tenants are requiring landlord
representations in their leases that buildings are asbestos free.
The net result is that no one I talked to will buy a building with an asbestos
problem ....
I want to reinforce ourpolicy. We will not buy or invest in any building that has
asbestos in it. There will be no exceptions until further notice ....
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F. Viability of the Court's Reasons Why Its Ruling is
Not Unfair to Landlords
The Becker court, in the latter part of its opinion, suggested three
factors within landlords' control which may mitigate the harshness of
imposing strict liability. They are, briefly, first, that a buyer can bargain
to pay less for an apartment building which is likely to contain defective
apartments; second, that a landlord can indemnify himself through the
doctrine of equitable indemnity or through the purchase of insurance;
and third, that a landlord can adjust the cost of rent.
1. The buyer may bargain with the seller
The majority began its argument by stating that "the cost of protect-
ing tenants is an appropriate cost of the enterprise.""I It stated that the
cost of purchasing rental housing is based on the anticipated risks and
rewards of the purchase, thereby suggesting that a landlord can protect
his economic interest by obtaining a purchase price "set off" equal to the
amount that the apartment will probably end up costing in terms of inju-
ries to tenants. The court suggested that the price of used rental housing
may depend "in part on the quality of the building and reflect the antici-
pated costs of protecting tenants, including repairs, replacement of de-
fects and insurance." '12 It is clear, though, that a landlord can only
repair things he knows about. If the defect is latent, the landlord cannot
reasonably discover it by inspection and thus, he will pay full price on the
purchase of the building. Then, once the latent defect which existed at
the time of the sale causes an injury, he will be liable. This gives the
seller a windfall. He received full price for the building and escaped any
liability he may have had if he had retained ownership. The buyer is
liable even though he could not do anything to protect himself.
Assume, however, for the sake of analysis, that things go according
to the court's plan. The buyer and seller of used rental property are now
free to bargain over the price of the building based on the quality of the
Memo to Coldwell Banker employees (1985) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Office).
This memo exemplifies one major difficulty brought about by the Becker opinion. Impos-
ing strict liability on landlords may inhibit banks and other financial lenders from making
loans to those who wish to buy older buildings. Further, commercial investors may shy away
from buildings they feel are a "bad risk." This may have drastic economic effects on the rental
market forcing those with high risk buildings to make a choice between taking a huge loss in
selling their buildings or suffering potentially disastrous liability.
211. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 466, 698 P.2d 116, 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 221
(1985).
212. Id.
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building and the likelihood that a tenant will be injured by a latent defect
which the landlord has not discovered. The obvious issue is whether this
is possible. Take, for example, IRM's thirty-six-unit complex. Of those
thirty-six units, thirty-one had untempered shower doors. Mr. Becker's
recovery to date has been $200,000.213 If IRM had exercised an amazing
level of foresight as to its potential liability for this single type of defect
and had bargained for a set off in the purchase price, that set off would
have equaled $7.2 million ($200,000 x thirty-one untempered shower
doors). However, if the court instead meant that the set off amount
should equal the recovery for one injury with the landlord repairing the
remaining apartments within the complex, the set off in IRM's case
would have been $200,000.214 But what other latent and undiscovered
defects lurk in IRM's apartment complex? And how can a dollar
amount be placed on these?
For the entire preceding discussion it has been assumed that IRM
knew about the rule adopted in this case and had thought ahead to real-
ize that it would be strictly liable for latent defects. However, IRM did
not negotiate its purchase of the apartment complex with the rule of this
case in mind and neither did any landlord who purchased his apartment
before the Becker decision was rendered.2 5 The result is that no land-
lord who purchased a preexisting apartment complex before that date did
so using the anticipated risk/cost balancing formula suggested by the
majority. They had no opportunity to weigh any factors. The majority
fails to take into consideration hardships placed upon landlords due to
the quasi-retroactive effect of its ruling.
2. The landlord may insure
The majority's second suggestion, that a landlord can indemnify
himself by seeking equitable indemnity for losses or through insurance is
also unsatisfactory. As previously addressed, Mr. Becker had completed
a good faith settlement with the builder, assembler and installer for the
amount of $150,000 plus $50,000 in the event that the plaintiff was un-
successful against IRM.21 6 Because of this good faith settlement with the
builder of the apartment complex, the assembler of the shower door and
the installer of that door, IRM is probably precluded from bringing an
213. See supra text accompanying note 195.
214. At least $200,000, exclusive of what the plaintiff stands to recover should it go on to
success against IRM Corp. at trial.
215. The Becker decision was rendered on April 29, 1985.
216. See supra text accompanying note 195.
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action against those parties for equitable indemnification.2 17 In other
cases, the builder of the apartment complex or the installer of a defective
component may no longer be in business or they, like the other defend-
ants in Becker, may wish to settle out of court rather than to undergo
expensive and time-consuming litigation. Because of these actions by the
other defendants, the landlord may find himself with no place to spread
the cost of compensating "defenseless" victims but down the marketing
chain, i.e., to his tenants by raising rents. Further, insurance may be
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain because of the recent trend of insur-
ance companies to stop writing insurance in certain high risk areas. If
insurance is available, it may prove to be prohibitively expensive. Once
again, with nowhere else to spread the burden of this cost, the landlord
may be forced to spread the cost down the marketing chain to tenants.
3. The landlord may raise rents
The court's final suggestion is that after the purchase of a used
rental dwelling landlords may "be able to adjust rents to reflect [the cost
of protecting tenants.]1 218 In light of the current shortage of low-cost
housing, however, how feasible is this solution? It would seem fair to
impose this extended form of strict liability for the tenant's protection
only if it were certain that the tenant could afford to pay for it.219 Alter-
nately, the tenant might be better off purchasing her own policy of insur-
ance to cover medical costs, etc.; at least she would have the option of
bargaining for a policy tailored to her needs at a competitive rate. It is,
however, manifestly unjust for the court to give with one hand and take
with the other.
Further, landlords in some areas are subject to rent control ordi-
nances which effectively leave them without the ability to "adjust"
rents.220 To impose strict liability upon landlords who have no way of
spreading the cost of injury up the marketing chain nor down the mar-
217. See supra note 196.
218. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (emphasis added).
219. This situation differs from that of car buyers who must pay more per car to get the
added protection that the government requires in that housing is a necessity. There are reason-
able alternatives to the lease or ownership of an automobile. If a prospective car buyer is out
looking for a car and finds that the model he wants is out of his price range, he can generally
go to a less expensive model without much disruption of his lifestyle. However, if a young
family of four goes out apartment shopping, a slight difference in price may mean the differ-
ence in affordability between an adequate two bedroom apartment and an inadequate one bed-
room apartment.
220. See, e.g., Alpha Standard Inv. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 118 Cal. App. 3d 185,
173 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 966 (1981); Apartment and Office Bldg. Ass'n of
Metro. Wash. v. Washington, 381 A.2d 588 (D.C. 1977); City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85
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keting chain leaves the landlord with no alternative other than to simply
go out of business. Certain municipal ordinances in California require
that once a piece of property is used to rent dwellings, it must remain in
that use.221 Thus, in some locales, even if the landlord is in danger of
losing the business, perhaps his only means of livelihood, he cannot
change the use of his property.222 Further, if the landlord could sell his
property, in light of this decision, what will it now be worth?
H. Probable Repercussions of the Rule
How does the rule formulated in Becker affect the future of strict
liability law in California, and how does it affect the future of tort law in
general?
As has been seen, the rule of Becker, intentionally or unintention-
ally, extends the law regarding the imposition of strict liability in two
ways. First, it focuses the discussion of "defect" on the apartment as a
whole rather than on one of the apartment's component parts. This re-
sults from the court's characterization of the leased dwelling as a product
in and of itself. Second, it imposes liability regardless of the fact that the
landlord did nothing to install, modify, or repair the defective fixture.
Becker made these two extensions on the basis of what it considered the
paramount policy for applying strict liability, that is, spreading the cost
of injury throughout society. In holding this as the paramount policy
consideration, the court ignored several other important policy consider-
ations. What is the fundamental statement of the court's paramount pol-
icy consideration, though, and does it offer a useful rule by which to
extend the doctrine of strict liability in other areas? Spreading the cost of
injury throughout society amounts to no more than a judicially imposed
insurance system. To use this rationale for imposing strict liability in
isolation of other rationales is to write a judicial ticket to impose strict
liability in any area of law where there are injured plaintiffs who may not
be compensated.
The rule of Becker affects tort law in general in that it threatens the
very heart and soul of the tort industry, the insurance dollar base. The
trend of insurance companies in previous years has been to write almost
Ill. 2d 101,421 N.E.2d 196 (1981); Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65
(1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 978 (1979), clarified, 82 N.J. 128, 411 A.2d 203 (1980).
221. See, e.g., Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr.
285 (1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1740 (1985); Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 176, 214 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1985); Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners'
Ass'n v. City of Oceanside, 157 Cal. App. 3d 887, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1984).
222. See supra note 221.
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any type of liability insurance at extremely low rates. Due to the losses
that have assailed that industry over the past few years (which some ar-
gue were self inflicted), insurance companies ceased writing certain types
of high risk liability policies and have raised premiums to prohibitive
levels.223
The result of this condition has left industries which operate at a
high risk of loss without insurance or with limited coverage at steadily
increasing rates. By creating a strict liability cause of action in any area
of the law, courts artificially inject into an industry a high risk of loss.
This forces the small proprietors of that industry to collapse under the
financial burden of either the likelihood of successful suits or the burden
of paralyzing insurance premiums.
In our society of ever-increasing population and urbanization, land-
lords serve an increasingly important function, providing housing to
those unable or unwilling to buy housing for themselves. If this function
is in any way deterred or hindered, who suffers? Those at the bottom of
the social strata suffer first. Those in need of inexpensive housing will
now find that commodity dwindling under the excessive burden placed
upon the industry by the courts. Further, as insurance companies find
their losses outweighing their gains, they will rapidly flee from writing
policies in the area.
I An Alternative Reading of the Rule of Becker
The Becker courti in formulating its holding, sought to extend the
rights of the tenant by offering him more protection in his relationship
with his landlord. This goal is certainly a worthwhile one. However, the
way in which it was accomplished seems undesirable for the reasons enu-
merated above. One way to eliminate Becker's undesirable aspects, yet
to retain its positive ones is to fashion an alternative reading of that rule.
Perhaps Becker can be read to impose strict liability on a landlord
only if he fails to detect defects which are "reasonably discoverable."
Those defects which are reasonably discoverable may be included in a
checklist offering both courts and landlords certainty, while offering the
tenant added protection.
Foundation for this interpretation of Becker may be found in the
decision itself. The holding in Becker states "a landlord engaged in the
business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting
from a latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the
223. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 2; L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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premises were let to the tenant."'224 The last clause seeks to distinguish
those defects existing at the time the premises were let from those arising
after the premises are let. This suggests that the court was willing only to
extend liability to the extent that the landlord had an opportunity to in-
spect for defects and disclose their existence to prospective tenants. This
reading is reinforced by the court's further language stressing the impor-
tance of the landlord's superior ability to inspect and his obligation to
disclose.225
These things, taken together, suggest that the court may have been
attempting to set a minimum standard of inspection for landlords. This
minimum standard included, in Becker, inspection of glass fixtures to
determine their safety propensities. The legislature or later courts may
find it useful to formulate a list of other things which a landlord has an
absolute duty to inspect. This list might include inspection of electrical
wiring by a certified electrician, inspection of plumbing by a certified
plumber, inspection for insect and rodent infestation and inspection for
dangerous fixtures or furniture. The submission by a landlord of this list
with signed compliance notices might be required as a prerequisite for
the leasing of any building or rental unit. Violators could be fined and
compelled to comply. If non-compliance could be proved where a tenant
or guest was injured, then strict liability could be imposed.226
This interpretation of Becker coupled with an effective system of en-
forcement seems to retain the good effect sought by the Becker court, yet
impinges less on the useful (albeit artificial) barriers erected around the
doctrine of strict liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in light of the considerations enumerated above,
Becker represents a vast and unwarranted extension in the area of strict
224. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464, 698 P.2d 116, 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219
(1985) (emphasis added). The court states in a footnote "[w]e do not determine whether strict
liability would apply to a disclosed defect." Id. (citations omitted).
225. As has been stated earlier, the court stressed that the "tenant's ability to inspect is
ordinarily substantially less than that of a purchaser of the property." Id. at 465, 698 P.2d at
122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. Further, the court stated "[a]bsent disclosure of defects, the land-
lord in renting the premises makes an implied representation that the premises are fit for use as
a dwelling and the representation is ordinarily indispensable to the lease." Id. at 464, 698 P.2d
at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
226. This system is reminiscent of a negligence per se system. It should be noted, however,
that this system, in order to retain the integrity of the strict liability doctrine, cannot constitute
merely a general "reasonable inspection" (negligence) standard. Rather, specific guidelines
should be adopted. These guidelines would be available for landlords to avoid strict liability
and for courts to impose strict liability where required.
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liability, and this extension threatens to increase exponentially the al-
ready dire shortage of low cost housing and imposes undue and unneces-
sary hardships on landlords. In assessing the propriety of tort liability,
the California Supreme Court seems to have lost sight of the fact that the
essence of law is justice. Justice requires a delicate balancing of hard-
ships and culpability before one party is forced to compensate another.
Recent decisions, including Becker, seem to disregard the fact that in
order to compensate a plaintiff for his injury, a corresponding injury
must be inflicted on a defendant. Thus, in a system like California's
where the issue of liability for injury due to defective products does not
involve an inquiry into the culpability of the defendant's conduct, a de-
fendant's right to be free from injury should weigh as heavily as a plain-
tiff's. For this reason and those enumerated above, Becker should be
read as imposing a minimum standard of inspection upon the landlord
with a violation of this standard accompanied by injury resulting in strict
liability to the landlord.
Richard Deeb*
* This article is dedicated to the memory of David Jon Vaca, 1962-1985.
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